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TO

HIS HIGHNESS

SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR

G.C.S.I., G.B.E.

MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

FOUNDER AND

CHANCELLOR OF THE MYSORE UNIVERSITY

THIS LITTLE BOOK IS
BY PERMISSION DEDICATED BY
THE AUTHOR IN TOKEN OF HIS ADMIRATION
OF HIS HIGHNESS' ENLIGHTENED POLICY IN DIFFUSING
KNOWLEDGE AMONG HIS PEOPLE AND HIS
PROFOUND INTEREST IN PHILOSOPHY
AND OF GRATITUDE FOR HIS
KIND HOSPITALITY

Preface

THIS little book contains the substance of some lectures that I have had occasion to deliver at various places in the course of the past three or four years. The nucleus of it was first set forth in the University of Mysore, on the invitation of the Registrar, Mr. V. Subramanya Iyer, to whom I owe a deep debt of gratitude. I wish to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks both to him and to many others in that delightful centre of culture. I may specially mention Principal Subba Rao and Professors A. R. Wadia (author of *The Ethics of Feminism*) and S. Radhakrishnan (now of the University of Calcutta, and well known for his many fine works on philosophy). I had the privilege of being the guest of the Maharaja, to whom I have now the honour of dedicating this volume, and whose generosity both to myself and to the University I shall not readily forget. The lectures were afterwards given in a more extended form in the University of Lucknow and later at Berkeley in the Summer Session of the University of California. Parts of them were also delivered at other Universities in India and the United States. At every place that I visited I was received with great kindness, and I cannot possibly enumerate all the people to whom I have been indebted; but I hope they will believe that I have

not forgotten any of them. I must at least mention Dr. Chakravarti, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lucknow, whose guest I was for more than a month, and Professor Keightley, of the same University, who was mainly responsible for the organization of my second tour in India; also Professor R. M. Wenley, of the University of Michigan, who arranged for my tour in America with elaborate care, and Professor G. P. Adams, of the University of California, who made the necessary arrangements for my stay in Berkeley and for my lectures there. Nor must I omit to mention Sir P. Ramanathan, formerly Solicitor-General of Ceylon, to whose kind invitation it was due that I had the opportunity of visiting India in the first instance, and by whose instructions I was initiated into many aspects of Indian life and thought. If I have failed to appreciate the worth and beauty of human life throughout the world, the fault is certainly not due to any lack of opportunity. The question has been raised, 'Is India civilized?' and some have even ventured to propound the same question about America. Both those communities of more or less united States have vast populations and overwhelming problems; but, if civility is the basis of civilization, I can answer the question in each case with an emphatic affirmative.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON,
May, 1924.

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INTRODUCTION

OUR PROBLEM

A FEW generations ago it would probably have been true to say that the term Value would have suggested little more to most people's minds than the price of commodities in the market. According to the old jingle that used to be quoted in text-books of economics,

> 'The value of a thing
> Is just as much as it will bring.'

Happily the deeper significance of the conception is now recognized even in economic studies; and the term is familiarly used with reference to art, religion, education, and indeed to all aspects of human life. In fact, so much has been written about values in recent times that it may seem almost a work of supererogation to attempt any fresh discussion of them. Hence some general statement of the object that I have here in view seems to be called for at the outset. It is not my object, even if it were in my power, to produce a treatise dealing comprehensively with value in all its aspects, psychological, metaphysical, ethical, artistic, industrial, and religious. For this I must refer to the works of the German and the Austrian psychologists and economists, to the scholarly treatise by Professor Urban, to the two great sets of Gifford Lectures by Bosanquet, to Professor Sorley's book on Moral Values, and to others that need not be

here enumerated. I intend to avoid, as far as possible, any consideration of the different modes of Valuation (*Wertung*, as the Germans call it), and to direct my attention to the intrinsic meaning of Value, with special reference to its highest or most ultimate form. This is a limited subject, but it can hardly be denied that it is both difficult and important. Its difficulty will, I fear, become sufficiently apparent as we proceed. Its importance has probably already been made sufficiently obvious to most readers by the discussions that have gathered round Nietzsche's conception of a transvaluation of all values (*Umwertung aller Werte*), if not in other ways.

The question that has sometimes been asked in recent times, 'Is life worth living?' is one that hardly occurs to human beings in their earlier years, and that probably did not occur at all in the early years of the world's history. Even when the joy of living was not felt to be its own justification, the exertions involved in carrying life on were generally enough to absorb the attention without reflection upon its ultimate significance. Yet, even in some pretty early ages of human history, there have not been wanting vague surmises that perhaps all is vanity, and that not to be is more desirable than to be. Even in the brightest times of ancient Greece such gloomy reflections were very common; as they were also in our own Elizabethan period. Few rest in such an attitude of mind; but many escape from it only by the pressure of inevitable distractions or by artificial devices

for killing care. Others—and this is especially true in some Oriental countries—are ready to avow that life is an evil, but believe that it is not really possible to escape from it finally except through elaborate processes of spiritual development. In order to have any clear view on this subject, we have to ask ourselves what we really understand by Good and Evil; and this is what is meant by the problem of intrinsic value.

I have thought it well to indicate at the outset that this problem is to be dealt with here in the light of contemporary thought. It is not meant by this that historical references are to be entirely excluded; nor, on the other hand, do I mean merely that, writing as I do at this present time, I am necessarily influenced by the currents of contemporary speculation. What I wish to indicate is that I believe the present to be a time of somewhat unusual ferment, comparable in this respect to the age of the great French Revolution, which was also approximately the age of the 'Copernican Revolution' of Kant, and of the great intellectual developments that followed from it. The political events of our time can hardly be thought less portentous than those that marked the conclusion of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth; and the recent transformations of thought in the physical sciences may be expected to lead to results as far-reaching as those that were initiated by Kant in philosophy; and philosophy can hardly fail to be—and, indeed, has already begun to be—profoundly affected by them. Hence

it has seemed desirable to lead up to what has to be said on the special subject of value by some reflections on the present outlook upon philosophical problems in general.

The most important fresh light that has been thrown upon the structure of our universe in recent times is that connected with the physico-chemical investigations into the ultimate constitution of material bodies, and with the theories of space and time that are closely connected with these investigations. One of the most interesting and hopeful features of these investigations is that they have brought the physical sciences into closer relations with philosophy than they have had for several generations. As Professor Muirhead has recently urged,[1] 'the most difficult and, for the moment at least, the most pressing of the secular problems that face idealistic philosophy at the present time is concerned with the co-ordination of its leading conceptions with the new ideas in physical science.' There is apt to be a certain antagonism between the ways in which the problems of reality are approached by the sciences and by philosophy respectively; and that antagonism was a good deal accentuated in the period that may be most conveniently regarded as stretching from the time of Leibniz and Berkeley to quite recent years. The opposition may be said to lie primarily in the contrast between the two conceptions that are expressed by the terms 'atom' and 'monad'; and the reconciliation between

[1] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 320.

science and philosophy has been brought about by the gradual abandonment of both conceptions. The structure of the physical atom is now seen to approximate to that of the Leibnizian monad; but the latter has, in the meantime, been provided with those 'windows' that Leibniz was compelled to deny. In other words, both in science and in philosophy the idea that is commonly expressed by the term 'substance' has been so greatly modified that it may almost be said to have been abandoned altogether. That idea can be traced back to the earliest beginnings of scientific and philosophic thought in Greece; and a short reference to those beginnings may help us to realize where we now stand.

At first, as we all know, there was no real distinction between philosophy and the special sciences. The early Greek philosophers raised the question, What is the world made of? and they sought to answer the question by pointing to physical phenomena, which they tried to resolve into their simplest elements. This attempt received a severe check from the teaching of Parmenides, who urged that ultimate reality must be thought of as an unchangeable and unanalyzable unity. The difficulties thus raised were pressed home by Zeno; and an attempt was made to meet them by the school of the Atomists, who maintained that ultimate reality has indeed to be thought of as unchangeable and unanalyzable, but not necessarily as a single unity. They introduced the conception of substantial reality as con-

sisting of a number of ultimate atoms, which undergo no change within themselves, but produce changes by their movements and interactions. This view of unchangeable atoms became the basis for most of the subsequent developments in the physical sciences; but philosophy soon passed on to a different standpoint, which gradually led to a more and more pronounced opposition between it and the physical sciences—an opposition that may, on the whole, be said to have reached its culmination in the nineteenth century of our era.

The source of this opposition is first to be found explicitly set forth in the teaching of Socrates. In a well-known passage in the *Phædo* he is represented as calling attention to the doctrine of Anaxagoras that Mind (νοῦς) is the great source of movement. Socrates urges that Anaxagoras did not take his doctrine seriously enough. If he had, he would have recognized that Mind is guided in its actions by the thought of what is best; in other words, that, if mind is the explanation of movement, the ultimate explanation of movement must be found in the conception of Value. The real cause must be thought of as a Final Cause, rather than as a First Cause. The passage in which this view is set forth by Plato is probably familiar to most readers; but it gives so good an introduction to our present problem that it may be worth while to quote it here, as translated by Jowett: 'I heard,' Socrates explains, 'some one who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which he read that mind was the disposer and cause

of all, and I was quite delighted at this notion, which appeared admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place. I rejoiced to think,' he goes on, 'that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and then he would further explain the cause and the necessity of this, and teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause,' and so on. 'I had hopes,' he says, 'which I would not have sold for much.' Aristotle also, at a later time, said that Anaxagoras seemed to be 'a sober man among those that idly babbled,' because he was the first who adopted νοῦς as a principle of explanation. But Socrates is represented as going on to complain that, as he went on reading the work of Anaxagoras, he found that, as soon as he came to problems of detailed explanation, Anaxagoras made no use of mind, but referred to the action of air, ether, water, and the like, just as the earlier physicists had done. 'I might compare him,' he goes on, 'to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he came to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the

bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture . . . and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Bœotia—by the dog of Egypt they would—if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen as the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, to undergo any punishment which the State inflicts.' Socrates goes on, however, to admit that it is not by any means easy to account for material phenomena by the conception of what is best; and, in fact, it is obviously not easy even to account for human actions by means of this principle alone. The modern behaviourists have gone far to show that at least a very large part of human conduct can be accounted for, like that of animals, without any explicit reference to conscious purpose.

But the view that is ascribed to Socrates in the *Phædo* was, if not actually worked out by himself, at least definitely developed by Plato in his conception of the 'Form of Good.' It was Plato's main effort to make clear the conception of Good, and to show how it might be applied, chiefly in the interpretation of human conduct, but also to some extent in the interpretation of nature; and it was essentially the same principle, though expressed with more caution, that lay at the basis of the philosophical system of Aristotle, which continued for a long time to dominate men's thoughts both in science and in philosophy, until Bacon made his famous declaration that Final Causes (*i.e.*, Values), 'like a virgin consecrated to God,' produce nothing.

Now, our present problem is to consider how far it is legitimate, in view of the recent developments in science, to regard Value as being still an interpretative principle. In order to do this it will be necessary to examine rather carefully what the conception of Value means in philosophy. But first it seems desirable to clear the ground a little by reference to some modern scientific conceptions. The philosophical significance of the conception of value cannot be properly understood without some consideration of the most important aspects of modern speculation in which its use is involved, or by which its use is rendered doubtful.

BOOK I

OUR THEORETICAL OUTLOOK

IN the introductory chapter the general object of this work has, I hope, been sufficiently explained. It is to ascertain the essential meaning of Value, in that interpretation of it which may be accepted as most ultimate and most important—the meaning that throws most light upon our final aims in life, and enables us most definitely to answer the old question, 'What is man's chief end?' In order, however, to see the full bearings of this problem, it is desirable to take a preliminary survey of our present position in philosophy. What value means for us depends a good deal upon the way in which reality is to be conceived; and the present century has already witnessed some striking transformations in the outlook both of science and of philosophy on that subject. I can only very briefly indicate here what I believe to be the bearing of these transformations upon our present problem.

It is well to remember that philosophy, as the term is now generally understood, is not one of the sciences, and must not be expected to throw any direct light on the special problems with which the particular sciences are concerned. Neither, it may be well to add, is philosophy an art or a religion or a way of conducting life; though it has intimate bearings upon all these things, to some of which we shall have occasion to refer later. It is not a

science; for the sciences deal with special branches of knowledge, whereas philosophy, in a sense, takes all knowledge for its province—*i.e.*, the general conditions that underlie all knowledge. It investigates the general presuppositions and the general consequences of the work of all the sciences. It is not one of the arts; for, though it seeks to create an harmonious unity in our vision of the world, this unity is not one that makes any sensuous appeal. It is not a religion; for, though it aims at the apprehension of the highest reality, it proceeds entirely by the way of reasoned inquiry, not by that of feeling or intuition or faith. It is not a way of conducting life; for, though its enterprise is prompted by the deepest needs of human experience, its mission terminates in the quest, rather than in any actions that may follow from it. A philosopher may also be a man of science, an artist, a devotee and a saint, just as he may also be a parent, an athlete, a merchant or a king. Some of these things may help him in his philosophy; some may hinder him; on some he may be able to throw important light; but to his philosophy as such they are all, in their details, more or less irrelevant.

There is one circumstance, however—and it is a rather comprehensive circumstance—which can hardly be ignored in the study of philosophy—viz., the time at which the quest is undertaken. Times change, and philosophies change with them. The philosophy contained in the Upanishads may bear a considerable resemblance to that of Plato, to

that of Spinoza, or to that of Kant; but there are inevitable differences, due to the general human atmosphere in which the philosophical quest was carried on. Hence, in dealing with the special problem that now concerns us, we have to take some account of the present outlook of human thought in general; and, for our purpose here, this must be done in a somewhat cursory fashion.

It has already been noted as one of the general characteristics of the thought of our time that the old conception of Substance has tended to decay or to be subordinated to other conceptions. The most notable book, I suppose, in recent British philosophy is Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. Soon after its publication it was renamed by a witty critic *The Disappearance of Reality*. This is at least misleading; but, if it were called *The Disappearance of Substance*, this would not be a very unfair characterization both of it and of most of the dominant tendencies in recent science and philosophy—perhaps one might even add in recent political developments. If substance has tended to disappear in philosophy, in physical science also the solid atom is in a precarious position, and in politics the old solid nation shows some signs of evanescence. Some reference to the recent development in physical science may be specially useful for our present purpose.

The general attitude of the physical sciences, in contrast with that of philosophy, may on the whole be described as analytical. The chemist takes complex bodies and splits them up into their con-

stituent molecules and atoms. The physicist investigates further the nature and modes of action of these ultimate particles. Until recently the atoms tended to be thought of as hard material elements; but recent developments in physical science have very largely transformed this conception. It is now generally recognized that the ultimate constituents of all material bodies have to be regarded as centres of electro-magnetic influence; and that no properties can be assigned to them except that of being such centres of action. The result of this is to break down the old distinction between matter and energy. We may say either that matter is nothing but a more or less persistent localization of energy; or that energy is a sort of ultimate matter. The latter way of speaking is what I understand to be meant by the 'quantum theory.' In effect, such a view really involves the breaking down of the purely analytical method of treatment. No ultimate constituent is now intelligible except in its relation to the whole system within which it acts.

It may be noted here that a somewhat similar development is to be found in the recent treatment of mathematical conceptions. Geometry, like physics, has sought—especially since the time of Descartes—to deal analytically with the forms of solid bodies. It leaves out the particular qualities or modes of influence that belong to bodies, and deals simply with their spatial relations. We pass from solids to surfaces, from surfaces to lines, and from lines to points; and the point thus

appears, like the old atom in physics, to be the last and simplest element in analysis. A line may then be regarded as a distance between points. But here also recent developments of mathematical science have brought out the difficulties involved in regarding the point as ultimate. It has to be regarded rather as the limit that is aimed at by converging series, and as incapable of any exact treatment without reference to those series.[1]

The general view of the world to which we are thus led is that of a systematic whole of interrelated elements, which are in themselves meaningless apart from the place that they occupy within the system. From the point of view of pure science, this system may perhaps be sufficiently described as the spatio-temporal continuum. It remains for philosophy to inquire whether this is, in the end, an adequate description. Some recent philosophical writers have, more or less definitely, accepted it as adequate; and a few remarks on their methods of developing it may be here in place. But before making any definite reference to these it may be well to note that the line of development in physical science has led to results that connect somewhat closely with those arrived at along another line of thinkers of a more purely philosophical type. This line of thought began, indeed, at a time when the distinction between philosophy and the physical sciences was not so sharply drawn as it has since been.

[1] On this reference may be made to the recent book on *Scientific Thought*, by Dr. C. D. Broad, pp. 41 *sqq.*

Most readers of this volume will be aware that the all-embracing doubt of Descartes was brought to an end by the conviction that, whatever else might be open to question, he could not deny that he himself, as a self-conscious being, did verily exist. He thought himself justified in stating this conviction in the form that he existed as a thinking substance (*res cogitans*); and, by arguments into which we cannot here enter, he was led to the conclusion that an infinite self-conscious Substance, absolutely perfect in all his attributes, has also to be postulated as existing; and that the recognition of such a Being entitles us to conclude that there are also a number of finite thinking beings other than ourselves, and that there is a non-thinking substance, filling the whole of space and undergoing changes in time. We cannot here follow the transformations that were introduced into this conception by the succeeding members of the Cartesian School, especially Geulincx, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz. It must suffice to state that the many substances recognized by Descartes were reduced by Spinoza to the one absolutely infinite Substance, with attributes and modes; and that Leibniz recognized a multiplicity of substances, described as Monads, containing various degrees of perfection, existing independently without interaction and without 'windows.' It may be noted that the transition from the infinite Substance of Spinoza to the many Monads of Leibniz is very similar to the transition in ancient Greek thought from the One of Parmenides to the many Atoms of

Democritus. But, for our present purpose, the changes that were introduced by the British School of thinkers, who approached the subject more purely from the psychological side, are of more immediate interest.

Locke, though approaching the subject from a more tentative and psychological side than the Cartesians, and throwing doubt on many of their conclusions, may yet be said to have recognized on the whole the same three fundamental forms of substance that had been singled out by Descartes. But he was speedily followed by Bishop Berkeley, who urged that the conception of substance, especially as applied to material things, was arrived at by an illegitimate abstraction. He pointed out that all we really know about what is commonly called the external world is that it consists of a variety of qualities that are apprehended by us in certain regular orders; and that they could be sufficiently accounted for as a sort of divine language by which the infinite Substance—or rather the infinite Mind—communicates with finite ones. The material substance was thus definitely set aside as an unnecessary and even unmeaning assumption. Hume, coming soon after, pointed out—what, indeed, Berkeley would not have denied—that the idea of a thinking *substance* was quite as unnecessary as that of a material one. What we really know about our own conscious existence is only that it consists of a series of perceptions of various qualities succeeding one another with inconceivable rapidity. The idea of substance was thus com-

pletely set aside; and with it went that of causation. Orderly change was all that we were entitled to recognize. Philosophy, in the person of David Hume, thus anticipated the conception of a spatio-temporal system of varying qualities, which is not far removed from the view to which modern physical science has gradually approached. Hume, however, was essentially a sceptic. He merely pointed out difficulties in the way of the conceptions of substance and causation, and did not set forth any positive theory for the interpretation of the world as we apprehend it. Subsequent philosophers, more or less definitely following Kant, have called attention to certain elements (commonly called categories) which the mind itself (not conceived as a substance, but as a fundamental mode of unity) contributes to the building up and interpretation of the world as we know it. These developments we cannot here discuss, though we may have occasion to refer to some of them later. Some of them have tended to reinstate the conception of substance, especially in forms more or less closely akin to those in which it was held by Spinoza and Leibniz; but for our present purpose it is enough to note that in philosophy, as well as in physical science—and earlier than in physical science—the conception of solid substances with qualities attached has tended to give place to that of qualities contained within certain comprehensive modes of unity. As an illustration of what is meant, reference may be made to one of the most notable of recent philosophical constructions in

which the results of modern physical science are largely incorporated.

Professor Alexander, in his very remarkable book on *Space, Time and Deity*, proceeds on the general view that the modern scientific conception of the spatio-temporal system is adequate as the basis for a general philosophical interpretation of our universe. He conceives that all the fundamental forms or categories of our experience can be deduced from the general character of the spatio-temporal system. He thinks of that system as a four-dimensional whole, three of its dimensions being spatial and one temporal, and all being infinite in extent. Within that whole qualities appear and develop from simpler to more complex forms, leading up eventually to a comprehensive Being who possesses the quality that is indicated by the term Deity. These qualities cannot be deduced from the conception of Space-Time, but their evolution can be traced along a connected order, and through the course of this order increasing values are created. All this is very elaborately worked out, and the system as a whole is certainly one of the most striking contributions to philosophical thought that have been made in recent generations; and I believe that a few remarks suggested by it may serve to lead us into the heart of our subject.

The chief criticisms that are suggested by it can be very briefly stated. In the first place, the general starting point of the system appears to be extremely formal. Space and time, standing in close relation to one another, are all that we have to begin with.

It thus looks as if we began with pure emptiness. But Professor Alexander contends that time is not empty, since it contains space; and that space is not empty, since it contains time. This reminds one rather too much of the famous islanders who earned a precarious livelihood by taking in one another's washing. It would seem that the real filling of the spatio-temporal system is supplied by the *qualities* that occur in them and that evolve from the most simple to the most complex types. But, if we start from pure space-time, it is hard to see where all these admirable qualities are to come from. Here we are reminded somewhat forcibly of Carlyle's remark that the making of the universe raises the same sort of problem as that which one of the Georges found in the making of a dumpling—'how the apples got in.' Professor Alexander, indeed, says quite frankly that 'quality is the great mystery'; but, as qualities appear to be the only concrete things that exist within his scheme, a theory that leaves their existence a mystery can hardly be counted very satisfactory.

Again, the evolutionary process does not seem to be very clearly explained. It is difficult to see what is the *élan*, as Professor Bergson calls it, by which we are led on from the lower to the higher qualities. The process, as he describes it, seems to be one that has a definite beginning and a definite end. It begins from pure space-time and ends in Deity. This appears, on the face of it, to mean that it begins in absolute emptiness and ends in absolute fullness; and how it can ever get from the

one to the other remains an unsolved mystery. Moreover, if time is infinite, it is hard to see how there can be either a beginning or an end; and, indeed, it seems to be conceived as somehow existing eternally and encircling, along with space, the entire system of reality. If so, Deity must surely be regarded as both beginning and end; and at best the setting out from pure space-time can only be regarded as having a methodological justification—and I should have thought that it could hardly even have that.

In view of all this, it seems desirable to discuss some fundamental conceptions that are involved in the general theory of the spatio-temporal system before proceeding to deal with the place that is to be assigned to the idea of value in it.

THE difficulty that has just been raised with regard to the filling of Space and Time raises the more general problem of the relation between Form and Matter. This is a very large problem which cannot be adequately dealt with in such a book as this; but some suggestions with regard to it seem to be demanded at the present stage. A brief reference to Aristotle's treatment of the subject may supply a convenient starting point. His view of Forms was based upon the so-called 'ideal theory' that was developed by Socrates and Plato. This was primarily a doctrine of universal types as providing the core of reality for all existing things; and Aristotle's modification consisted chiefly in introducing the conception of a scale of beings, advancing from the lowest to the highest, and embodying more and more comprehensive types, forms or universals. At the bottom of the scale there was what he described as the first material—πρῶτη ὕλη: at the top there was the most comprehensive form of thought—the divine intelligence, without matter in itself, but conceived as giving reality to everything that exists. It was this conception, more than anything else, that enabled Aristotle to give a clear and connected account of all the sciences that were known in his time, and to provide at least a first sketch of some

that could hardly be said to have been previously known at all. But, though his system was on the whole admirably clear in its parts, it left considerable difficulties in the way of thinking of it as a whole.

It was at the beginning and the end that the chief difficulties of Aristotle's philosophy were to be found. The πρῶτη ὕλη seemed to be a mere negation. All that one could say of it was that it was not formed; and it was particularly hard to see how such a negation at the beginning of the scale could be connected with a great creative principle at the end. The difficulty in Professor Alexander's system is similar, and is perhaps even intrinsically greater; since Space-Time can hardly be regarded as being in itself a creative principle; and, on the other hand, what has to be connected with this central conception is not a mere negation, but a series of distinguishable qualities leading up through an ascending scale to Deity. If Deity could be placed at the beginning instead of at the end, and could be supposed to operate in accordance with some such principle as that of value, there might be some possibility of deducing particular qualities from that. It is in this way that the difficulty to which I am calling attention connects with our present subject; but it will be well to consider it for a little without any explicit reference to that subject.

In order to see the exact significance of these difficulties and possible ways of meeting them, there are two important conceptions that have to be

considered, which can perhaps be best denoted by the terms Universals and Orders.

A particular colour, such as blue, has to be regarded as a universal, in the sense that there are many instances in all of which that quality appears. Similarly 'bird' is a universal, since there are many creatures to which what is meant by that term applies. Birds, however, possess many qualities, of which blueness may be one. If so, as Professor Stout has recently urged,[1] the blueness that belongs to any particular bird is itself a particular blueness. But again a bird is an animal being, and blue is a colour. 'Animal being' and 'colour' are more comprehensive universals than 'bird' and 'blue.' Now, colours can be arranged in certain orders. Blue is nearer to green than it is to yellow or red; and all the colours can be arranged—as they are partially in the spectrum—in the order of their natural affinities. Similarly, though with somewhat less definiteness, animal beings can be arranged in certain orders. A bird is nearer to a bat than to an elephant; and a man is nearer to an ape than to a crocodile. There are thus various orders in which things may be arranged in accordance with their natural resemblances, affinities, or nearnesses. Nearness or distance in space and time is one very comprehensive basis for such an arrangement; and thus Space and Time may be described as comprehensive orders. In the sense that has now been explained, it would appear that every particular

[1] In his paper on Universals read before the British Academy.

thing may be brought under certain universal conceptions and assigned to a place within certain orders; and this seems to be a very important and fundamental fact with regard to them.

Now, it appears on reflection that there is one very significant general difference between orders and the particular things that can be arranged within them—viz., that the particular things are finite, whereas the orders when considered simply in themselves, are infinite. In some cases this difference is much more apparent than it is in others; but I believe it will be found that it is always essentially true. It is pretty clear, for instance, in the case of numbers; it is much less obvious in the case of colours. But, when the precise meaning of the statement is duly noted, it becomes apparent that it is of universal application. Illustrations from the case of number may help to convince us of its truth.

It may be taken as certain that nobody ever saw an infinite number of things of any kind; and it is at least doubtful whether such a thing is even conceivable. On the other hand, it seems clear that we cannot assign any limits to the numbers that might be placed within the general order 1, 2, 3. . . . Such an order has no assignable end. On the other hand, it is well to note that this particular order has a definite beginning. The first ordinal number is 1; and the first cardinal number is 0. Again, any number of things may be conceived as being divided into parts. Even one thing may be so conceived as divided; and, from the point of view of pure

arithmetic, there is no assignable limit to the number of fractions that may be placed between the numbers 0 and 1. On the other hand, particular objects that are placed within the numerical order may be limited; and it seems obvious, at least in many cases, that they are not capable of indefinite subdivision without losing their essential nature. If it is true, for instance, that the Divine Being is to be thought of as a Trinity, it may be presumed that that number cannot be either increased or diminished. It is commonly said that there are seven colours in the spectrum. By recognizing minuter shades of difference, the number of recognizable colours might be considerably increased; but it does not appear that it could be increased indefinitely. Our earth could contain more inhabitants than are at present on it, but hardly an infinite number. Again, a flock of sixty-four sheep may be divided into two parts, and that again into other two, and so on until it is split up into the single units of which it is composed. But a single sheep cannot be divided into two equal parts without each of them ceasing to exist as a living creature. And so in other cases. An order may be indefinitely increased or diminished; but, in general, the particular things that are placed in that order cannot be thus increased or diminished indefinitely. And the orders to which this possibility of indefinite increase or diminution can be most confidently ascribed would appear to be those of Number, Space, and Time. Now, there are some important problems that are closely connected with this fact,

and of these it may be well to take some account at this point. The most notable are those that were emphasized by Zeno in his famous paradoxes with reference to Achilles and the Tortoise and to the Flying Arrow—two somewhat puzzling problems, to which a good deal of attention has been directed in recent times. Some consideration of them may help us at the present point.

The well-known problem of Achilles and the Tortoise[1]—*i.e.*, of a swift runner trying to overtake a slow one—is obvious enough in itself; but it may be well to give it a little more definiteness by fixing an exact ratio between the degrees of speed. Let us suppose that the one runner moves just twice as fast as the other. Again, it is not desirable, at least in the first instance, to complicate the problem by selecting moving bodies that so obviously progress, not continuously but by a succession of steps. It might be better to think of something that glides, such as a fish in pursuit of its prey, or a bullet pursuing a swiftly moving bird. Whatever the moving body may be, the problem remains the same.

A B C D E

A body at the point A is moving rapidly towards B; and another body at the point B is moving towards C at just half the speed of the former. When the first body (call it Achilles for short) reaches the point B, the second (Tortoise) has

[1] See Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy*, chap. viii.

arrived at the point C. When Achilles gets to the point C, Tortoise has arrived at D. When Achilles gets to D, Tortoise is at E; and so on. It is evident that this process may go on indefinitely; and that, consequently, Achilles can never overtake Tortoise. Yet we know that swift bodies do overtake and pass slow ones. How is this to be explained? It would seem that there are only two ways in which the difficulty can be removed.

The first way—the way, I believe, that has been most commonly adopted—is to say that the difficulty can be removed by a truer conception of infinity. The difficulty arises from the supposition that a movement which can be split up into an infinite number of successive parts, is a movement that can never be completed. It is forgotten that there is not only an infinite number of positions in such a movement but also an infinite number of moments at which these positions are occupied; so that for every minute part of space that has to be covered there in a minute part of time in which it can be done. The fact that these minute parts have to be supposed to be infinitesimal, does not, according to this view, create any real difficulty. This certainly seems, on the face of it, to be a possible solution; but the difficulty involved in it appears to me to be much greater than mathematicians are commonly prepared to allow. There is, I admit, no particular difficulty in supposing that a merely formal entity, such as space or time or number, may be indefinitely divisible into parts. Being a mere form, we may be sure that it will not offer any

resistance to such a process. Achilles, on the other hand, or a tortoise or a fish or a bird or a bullet, is not a pure form; and it is at least open to grave doubt whether such beings can be supposed to be capable of indefinite subdivision. It is true that according to modern physics, as we have already noticed, such beings are no longer to be thought of as made up of indivisible atoms; but even centres of electro-magnetic influence would seem to be unanalyzable ultimates. If we cannot assign to them any definite extent, this is not due to the absence of magnitude, but rather to the fact that they can hardly be separated, even in thought, from the whole system of interactions within which they are included. On the other hand, a point seems to be only a limiting conception, having some significance as a spatial determination, but not capable of being thought of as an existing thing. To say that a portion of space can be indefinitely subdivided appears to mean only that we cannot assign any limits to the possibility of its subdivision. This is only a negative conception. It does not imply that any positive part that is infinitely little can be supposed to exist. Hence, with all due respect for the mathematicians, I feel bound to look, though with a good deal of diffidence, for a different sort of solution for Zeno's puzzle.

The other possible solution is partly suggested by Zeno's second paradox, which is expressed in the saying that 'the flying arrow rests'; and it can probably be best explained by reference to that saying. The meaning of it is, of course, that,

however rapidly an arrow may appear to be moving, it has to pass through a succession of definite positions; and at each of these positions (whether finite or infinite in number) it may rightly be said to be at rest. Hence, instead of saying that it moves through a succession of distinguishable positions, it would be truer to say that it *is* at a number of different positions at different times. Now, if we suppose the space through which it travels to be capable of a subdivision which is not merely indefinite but positively infinite, it would seem to be necessary to suppose that it rests at an infinite number of distinct points. I understand this to be the view that is accepted by Mr. Russell; and it does not essentially differ from the view given in the previous paragraph with reference to the problem of Achilles and the Tortoise. But there is another possible solution. It may be maintained that there is only a limited number of distinguishable positions in the motion of the arrow. It may be urged, of course, that this would imply that there is a gap between each of its successive positions; and this means, it may be said, that it passes out of existence and returns into existence at every point in its course. This would bring us back to something at least closely akin to the doctrine of Descartes, that every moment of time is a fresh creation. This, it may be said, is an even more paradoxical view than that of Mr. Russell. But I think the latter view really involves the same paradox. My chief reason for preferring the view of gaps to that of infinitesimals arises from

the consideration of certain difficulties specially connected with the forms of Space and Time. I think it will be best to refer to these in a separate chapter. In the meantime, it must suffice to make a few observations about the difficulty contained in the conception of gaps.

It seems, on the face of it, that gaps frequently occur in the lives of beings of a much higher type than tortoises. In a deep sleep or a dead faint the conscious life of a human being appears at least to be for a time suspended. When he wakes again out of such a condition, however, we consider him to be the same person that he was before. No doubt this is partly due to the fact that there is no apparent breach of continuity in his bodily existence. But, quite apart from that, the fact that his consciousness retains, on the whole, the same content that it had previously, leads us to disregard the apparent breach of continuity and think of him as still essentially the same being. Some would urge that, in order to maintain this view, we have to suppose that, in reality, there was a continuity of consciousness throughout, though it may have been forgotten. We here come upon the old discussion as to whether 'the soul thinks always.' We cannot hope to settle that problem here. I would only urge that the mere fact of a general identity of content in consciousness seems a sufficient ground for regarding a particular person as remaining essentially the same. If it were literally true that within two separate bodies there were 'two souls with but a single

thought, two hearts that beat as one,' I think we should be entitled to regard the two apparently distinct personalities as being in reality one. It is now generally recognized that there is no such thing as absolute identity without any difference. Hence it seems at least a possible solution of the difficulties raised by Zeno to say that there are intervals in the motion of a tortoise or of an arrow, and that, in virtue of these intervals one moving body may overtake another; and this view may be held without prejudice to the doctrine that, formally regarded, space and time must be supposed to be capable of indefinite subdivision. How this whole controversy bears upon the problem of Value will, I trust, become apparent as we proceed. I may perhaps just be permitted to hint that it bears especially upon the problem of the conservation of values throughout changing conditions—a problem to which we shall have occasion to refer at a much later stage. In the meantime, there are some further points with reference to Space and Time that call for consideration in a separate chapter.

Chapter III *Space and Time*

SPACE and Time appear to be the two great forms within which all the events in our universe take place. Whether there are other universes than that of our spatio-temporal system, just as there are other worlds than ours within that system, we need not here inquire. It is enough for us at present that our lives are carried on upon this earth, and that this earth exists within the spatio-temporal universe. Now, it seems clear, from what has been discussed in the preceding chapter, that space and time must, simply as forms, be regarded as indefinitely extended and as capable of indefinite subdivision. Whether this entitles us to speak of the spatio-temporal system as an infinite whole, is quite another question. The spatio-temporal system is apparently not a mere form, but a vast totality of changing events; and, if the view taken in the preceding chapter is correct, these cannot be regarded as either infinite in extent or capable of an infinite process of subdivision. But, when space and time are considered as the comprehensive forms within which all that we experience takes place, there are very special difficulties in the way of thinking of the things that exist and the processes that take place within them either as limited or as unlimited.

These difficulties have often been discussed, but never, I think, so thoroughly and comprehensively as in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason;* and most of what I have to say on the subject is little else than an exposition of his main line of argument.

His general contention is that the spatio-temporal system cannot be thought of either as finite or as infinite in extent; and that any particular thing that exists within that system cannot be thought of either as capable of an infinite process of subdivision or as consisting of ultimate indivisible parts.

With regard to the problem of subdivision, the difficulties have perhaps been sufficiently dealt with for our present purpose in the preceding chapter; but about the infinite extension of the world in space and time something further has to be stated. With regard to Kant's contention, that it is impossible to suppose that the world in time never had a beginning, I may say at once that his argument appears to me to be absolutely conclusive; but, as doubts have been thrown upon it, notably by Mr. Russell,[1] it may be well to emphasize it here.

Kant's contention is that, if we assume that there has been an infinite extent of time in the past, we must interpret this as meaning that an infinite series has been completed; and that this is inconceivable. This argument appears to me to be perfectly valid. It is clear that there is no particular

[1] In his book on *Our Knowledge of the External World.*

difficulty in supposing that a process that has once begun may continue to go on indefinitely. This is only a negative supposition: it only means that the process may never stop. But to say that a process that is now going on never began, is equivalent to saying that an actually infinite series has been completed in the past. If we denote the series stretching forward into the future by the terms $+1, +2, +3, +4 \ldots. +n$, and the series stretching back into the past by the terms $-1, -2, -3, -4 \ldots. -n$, then it is clear that, however great $+n$ may be, there is always a greater to follow, whereas we must suppose that there is some value for $-n$ which is positively infinite; since everything in the past must be supposed to *have occurred.* A future infinity means only that there is a series of events which will never be completed; but a past infinity means that such a series *has been completed;* and this seems to be absurd.

But Kant goes on to urge that there is just as much difficulty in supposing that the events that have been going on throughout the past had a beginning. On this his argument seems to me much less conclusive. What he contends is that to suppose any actual beginning of the series of events in the history of our universe is to assume that at some point of time an occurrence began to be without any antecedent condition. Now, there is nothing in any point of time, simply as such, that could lead an event to occur *there* rather than at any other point. What is forgotten here, I think, is that, time being a mere form, there is no

existing time before the beginning.[1] That beginning is the beginning of the spatio-temporal system, and there is no temporal beginning before it. The difficulty here, in short, is not really with regard to time at all, but rather with regard to causation. It simply lies in the question, how anything ever came to be at all. But it seems possible to give some sort of answer to this, if once we recognize that the spatio-temporal system is a limited thing. If this is the case, there is nothing of the same sort, so to speak, either before or after it—nothing, that is to say, which is spatio-temporal. Whatever can, in any intelligible sense, be said to be before or after it, must belong to some different form or universe.

It has always seemed to me that the best way of making this very difficult conception clear is to compare it with the way in which we have to think of some limited mode of existence of a subordinate kind, such as a play. When a play is purely imaginative, not concerned definitely with historical events, it is not necessary to suppose anything either before or after what is dealt with in it. This is true even of such a play as Shakespeare's *Macbeth;* for it is pretty clear that the Duncan and Macbeth who appear in it, interesting though they are, are not the Duncan and Macbeth of history.

[1] Perhaps I ought rather to say that this is what Kant was seeking to show. He was really arguing against the view that space and time are to be regarded as substantial things. But, as we are not specially dealing with Kant's philosophy here, it is simpler to say that, once we have recognized that time is only a form, this particular argument is not cogent.

But it is better to think of some more purely imaginative work. Goethe's *Faust*, for instance, contains a great number of remarkable occurrences, which can hardly be supposed to have taken place anywhere else than in that particular play. They may thus be regarded as forming a self-contained system, comparable in that respect to the spatio-temporal universe. A fairy-tale that tells of things that happened 'once upon a time' might be an even better illustration of what is meant. But substantially it is true even of *Faust* that the events in it were simply created by Goethe—making use, no doubt, of many suggestions from other writers and from old traditions. Now, Goethe himself lived at a particular time, and, during the greater part of his life, he was more or less occupied with the composition of that play. But the time during which Goethe lived and wrote is part of our spatio-temporal system; whereas the events represented in *Faust* are not things that have occurred within that system.

Now, when it is contended that the spatio-temporal system must have had a beginning, we are no doubt led to ask how it could have begun; and the raising of this question leads very naturally to the thought of a Creator existing before our universe began to be. But it seems possible to regard the relation of the Creator to the created on the analogy of the relation of Goethe to *Faust*, rather than on the analogy of Watt to the steam-engine, or Bismarck to the German Empire. The time in which the Creator acts need not be thought

of as being the same as the time of the spatio-temporal system. It may, for instance, be in some respects more correct to think of that system as drawn towards the Divine or Absolute being, rather than as issuing from that being. This appears to be what is implied by the Aristotelian phrase κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον. The universe may be created by the desire for the supreme Value, rather than by the propulsion of a supreme Force; and, in this sense, Professor Alexander may be right in thinking of Deity as at the end, rather than as at the beginning of the cosmic process. Or again, the Being to whom that quality is ascribed, may be supposed to be both Alpha and Omega, both at the beginning and at the end. But what, in that case, it may be asked, is to be said of the time that belongs to that Being in itself? Perhaps the less we say of it the better. It can hardly be supposed possible for us really to comprehend the Absolute. But perhaps one of the least inadequate ways of thinking of that time may be to represent it to ourselves as a circle returning into itself. To find a better way than this would carry us too far away from our present problem.

Further speculation about this would be irrelevant at this point. But it is something to have suggested that there is at least a possibility that Value may contain a better interpretation of the creative process than any conception of a propelling force. When we have considered what Value is, we may be better able to see what this would imply. In the meantime, however, it may be

noted that the speculations that have gathered so copiously round the recent researches of Einstein, appear to give support at least to the contention that the spatio-temporal system is to be regarded as limited. This was already urged with regard to the origin of the mechanical system of nature by Lord Kelvin and others; but other weighty authorities, such as Arrhenius, have been disposed to think of the spatio-temporal system as infinite. The view of Einstein (who is, however, careful to refrain from dealing with purely metaphysical problems) seems to require that that system should be conceived as limited, though of course immensely large both spatially and temporally; and, whatever may be thought of Einstein's speculations in general—a matter that is still *sub judice*—this view of the spatio-temporal system as a self-contained but limited whole, appears to be gaining an increasing amount of acceptance among competent thinkers, and to be the only one that is ultimately intelligible.

Does such a view, it may be asked, commit us to the doctrine that the spatio-temporal system is to be regarded as mere Appearance or Mâya, as in the Vedanta philosophy, or, in Kant's phrase, as only phenomenally real? To answer this, we must try to consider, as briefly as possible, what is to be understood by Appearance and Reality.

MR. BRADLEY'S great work on *Appearance and Reality* is probably the most important contribution that has been made to the constructive treatment of philosophical problems since the time of Hegel. In that book great emphasis is laid on the conception of Degrees of Reality. It may be doubted whether the expression is an altogether happy one. It appears to mean rather degrees of adequacy in the apprehension of reality, or degrees of correctness in the views that we form about it. So interpreted, it may be said to relate to a form of valuation. It means that some views and some modes of apprehension have more value than others in the pursuit of truth, which is generally accepted as one of the chief ends of human life. Hence some remarks about this can hardly be out of place in an introduction to the study of Value.

However exactly such phrases as 'degrees of Truth' and 'degrees of Reality' are to be interpreted, they seem at least to imply that the distinction between what is real and what is illusory is not one that can be quite so sharply drawn as we are apt at first to suppose. And indeed it seems clear, on reflection, that illusions are in some sense real, and that what we commonly reckon as realities are to some extent illusory. This has been emphasized, in a manner somewhat different from that

of Mr. Bradley, by representatives of the schools of neo-realists—notably by Professors Nunn and Alexander.[1] What they have urged is that everything that is commonly described as illusory is, in a sense, just as real as anything else. And, with some qualifications (which, I believe, they would allow), this may certainly be admitted. As illustrations of what is meant, we may take such cases as the apparent bending of a stick when it is partially immersed in water, the change of shape in a coin or other circular object when it is viewed from the side, the reflection of a man in a mirror, the diminution in the size of objects as we move away from them, the doubling of a little ball when it is placed between the crossed fingers, etc. Let us try to see what is the sense in which it may be maintained that such appearances are not illusory. Probably the best one to begin with for this purpose is the bending of the stick in water. For the sake of definiteness, let us suppose that it is a straight stick coloured green, and that half of it is immersed in water. It still looks green, but it seems to be bent at the point at which it enters the water. Now, of course, it is true to say that this is illusory. But in what does the illusion consist? It consists, I suppose, in the fact that we are, at least momentarily, led to suppose that the stick is really bent, in the sense that, if we were to take it out of the water, it would still retain a bent appearance, and would feel bent if we passed our hands along it. These suppositions are erroneous;

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book III., chap. viii.

but it may be urged that there is no illusion in what we actually see, any more than in any other visible object. If I meet someone in the street whom I have never seen, I may for a moment imagine that he is an old acquaintance, and be on the point of greeting him as such. Then I realize that he is not the person that I supposed him to be. I have made a mistake in identification. But what I saw was right enough. I only drew a wrong inference from it. So it is also with the bent stick. The rays of light really are deflected on entering the water, and that is all that I have a right to infer from the appearance. If I say that the bent stick is an illusion, I might just as well say that the straight one is so too; for probably there may be some error in the way in which that also is apprehended. This calls for some further consideration.

When the owner of the green stick takes it out of the water, and convinces himself that it is just as straight as it was before, he may think that now at least he is under no illusion about it. But it may very well be that he is just as much in error about it as he was when it appeared to be bent. For, when he looks at it now, it seems to have a green colour spread all over its surface; and further reflection may convince him that this is not really the case. If he consults someone who is familiar with the science of Optics, he will probably be told that it is incorrect to think of the stick as having colour spread upon its surface; and that this appearance is, in reality, due to the reflection of rays of light from its surface to the eye, where,

by certain processes that are not very well understood, the impression of green is conveyed to the mind. He might thus be led to think that green exists only in the mind. This also would probably be erroneous; but we cannot here pursue the matter much farther. Perhaps the owner of the stick might be supposed at this point to admit that all the ways in which he had been thinking about colour in relation to his stick were more or less mistaken. He would no longer think of the stick as a substance to which the quality colour was attached. But he might still think of it as a hard material thing capable of indefinite subdivision into parts similar to itself. The modern physicist, as we have already noted, would probably be able to convince him that this also is an error—that the stick, in reality, is only a temporary complex of minute centres of electro-magnetic action.

Reflections of this kind may very readily lead to the belief that all is Mâya, that every kind of statement that can be made about the world that we apprehend must be more or less erroneous; and that the distinction between truth and error is, in the last resort, only one of practical convenience. This appears to have been the view of Protagoras, if we can rely upon the account of him that is given in the *Theætetus* of Plato; and the contention of Protagoras has been ably defended in recent times by Dr. Schiller.[1] According to this doctrine, there is no such thing as absolute truth. One statement is not truer than another, but only more con-

[1] See his book *Plato or Protagoras?*

venient for certain practical purposes, and in that sense more correct—just as we commonly say that certain modes of behaviour are more correct than others. In other words, according to this view, truth is essentially a mode of value, and nothing more. This at least enables us to see how this topic bears upon the subject with which we are concerned in the present treatise; and we may be better able to pass a judgment upon it when we have considered what value means.

In the meantime, I must be content to state that it does not appear to me that we ought to go quite as far as Protagoras appears to have done; but it has to be admitted that it is very difficult to make any statements about ultimate reality that can be accepted as rigorously true. The sort of statements that I should regard as approximating most closely to such a character might be indicated by the following. Taking the instance previously referred to, instead of saying that green is spread on the surface of the stick, or that it is in the eye, or that it is in the mind, I should be disposed to say rather that it is primarily contained in that universal form which we may call the system of colours; and that within that system it lies between yellow and blue; and that further, besides being one of the subordinate universals within that comprehensive order, particular instances of it occur in various parts of the spatio-temporal system, in connection with other qualities that are contained within that system—among others, in connection with those qualities that we describe as mental.

Such a statement as this I should believe to be true, and not merely a convenient way of speaking—which, indeed, it can hardly be said to be. But to discuss this question further would carry us far from our present subject. That it is not without some important bearing on the subject of value, must, I should suppose, have become sufficiently apparent.

If the view that I have been trying to indicate is correct, what we have to say in the end is that what is ultimately real is the whole system of things; and that particular objects within that system are correctly apprehended only when they are seen in the place that rightly belongs to them within the whole. So long as they are not thus seen, we may be fairly said to be dealing only with Mâya (if this is the right interpretation of that elusive term), or with what is only phenomenally real. This is sometimes—I think rather perversely—expressed by saying that the Whole or the Absolute is the only substance, and that particular things or persons are its adjectives.[1] Such a mode of expression seems to me to take us back to Spinoza, one might almost say to Parmenides. In reality, change seems to be as real as permanence, multiplicity as unity. The real, it would seem, is properly to be ragarded as a Cosmos. If it is to be thought of as a Whole, at least it should be conceived as a living Whole, as indeed it is by some of the most prominent representatives both of

[1] See the Discussion in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18.

realism and of idealism—by Professor Alexander no less than by Mr. Bradley. The very fact that it is such a Whole prevents the nature of things from being fully apparent when we view them only at a particular point. We have to take account not only of what a thing *is* (as it appears at any given moment), but also of what it was and of what it has in it to be—what Aristotle seems to have meant by his curious phrase *τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι.* This leads us to notice, a little more definitely, the significance of the conceptions of Potentiality and Actuality.

Chapter V *Potentiality and Actuality*

IT was noted in the preceding chapter that it appears to be wrong to think of reality as either simply permanent or simply changing, and that illusions tend to arise when we accept the first appearance of an object as its full and permanent nature. Everything that we apprehend is, in that sense, more or less illusory. Even for the consciousness of a child the world is not quite such an 'unsubstantial, fairy place' as it has been represented by Lewis Carroll; but even for the consciousness of the adult it is sufficiently fantastic to make such a representation not only entertaining but instructive. It is perhaps hardly too much to say that such literature is almost the only kind that makes a universal appeal. Whatever else we may think about our universe, everyone is more or less aware that things are not always what they seem. But the element of illusion is especially great when the object with which we are concerned is such that it is part of its essential nature only gradually to reveal what it is. We get a very imperfect conception of the nature of a caterpillar if we do not realize that it may become a butterfly; and of the butterfly if we do not realize that it has been a caterpillar. An egg is not properly under-

stood without some apprehension of the bird that will emerge from it; nor a child without the knowledge that, in the course of nature, it will develop into a man or woman. All through the natural world we have to recognize the antithesis which Aristotle described as that between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, potentiality and actuality (or realization). It appears, however, in many forms that are not quite as obvious as those to which reference has just been made. If a seed, for instance, has the potentiality of becoming a tree, the tree also has the potentiality of becoming transmuted into coal, and the coal has the potentiality (derived ultimately from the sun) of supplying the moving force that may propel a locomotive.

Potentiality, however, is a somewhat elusive conception, and is apt to prove misleading. A school of philosophy that was pretty prominent a generation or two ago, put forward the view, based largely upon the doctrine of Berkeley, that the material system is to be regarded simply as 'a permanent possibility of sensation.' Against this it has been urged that 'a naked possibility is nothing.' Nothing can be a *mere* possibility. It must have some sort of actual existence of its own in order to contain the potentiality of anything else. A possibility of sensation can hardly be conceived otherwise than as some quality capable of yielding sense impressions. What is implied in the conception of potentiality is that things are not *isolated*, but stand in constant interchange with others. This is a favourite conception with the poets. Blake

spoke of seeing infinity in a grain of sand; and Shelley declared explicitly that

> 'Nothing in the world is single ;
> All things by a law divine
> In one another's being mingle.'

Tennyson's phrase about the 'flower in the crannied wall' is even better known:

> 'If I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is.'

Yet this is not to say that things do not possess a definite and individual nature of their own. It is only in madness that one is led to talk like poor Ophelia—'They say that the owl was a baker's daughter. We know what we are, but know not what we may be.' Such metamorphoses as those described by Ovid are no longer taken seriously, if indeed they ever were. But Goethe's conception of the metamorphoses of plants is still counted of some importance; and scientific men still speak of 'potential energy.' What seems to be really implied in the conception of potentiality is that existing things are complex, and that wandering fragments are constantly in search of their counterparts. Insane people are often said to be 'not all there,' and, after any sudden shock, people are often apt to feel as if something had gone out of them. Horatio, when asked if he is there, after the appearance of the Ghost, answers 'a piece of him.' Almost all animals and plants are produced by the combination of distinct germs, each of which by itself can only be described as a potentiality.

Now, in all such cases, there is a sense in which it may be urged that the actuality is prior to the potentiality. The merely potential being appears to be meaningless until we see what it has in it to become (*τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι*). Potential energy is only intelligible as something that is *not* at present in operation; and a child would seem to be a ridiculous absurdity if we did not know that he is on the way to manhood; though it is true also that, in the process of growth, the man is apt to lose something that belonged to him at first; and that he may, in the end, be led to aspire to become, in certain aspects, like a little child.

In the light of this conception it seems to become a little easier to understand in what sense it may be maintained that our universe contains both the aspects of permanence and change. It may be held that the whole does not change. The general nature and structure of the system is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; and it may be that, from any point of view at which the whole could be surveyed, it would be seen that nothing really perishes, and that what comes into being is already implied in what has been before. It seems necessary, in some sense, to maintain this if the universe is to be regarded as a system at all. The present must be held to be, in Leibniz's phrase, 'big with the future.' The sense in which we may think of the whole as unchanging, and yet as containing change within it, was partly indicated in the previous chapter by the distinction that was there referred to between the time of a dramatic

author's life and the time of the play that he has written. The play of *Macbeth*, for instance, is full of stirring incidents and rapid movements; but the play, once produced, remains unchanging for all time. There were, no doubt, changes in Shakespeare's life also at the time when the play was written; but these changes have no special relations to the changes within the play, and belong to quite a different time. Similarly, it seems not unintelligible to suppose that the Absolute may be essentially an unchanging Being; and that the time of our universe exists eternally as a changing process within that Whole. I admit, of course, that such a view is difficult to comprehend; but everything relating to the Absolute must be difficult to comprehend. I am aware also that a view of this kind sends a chill into many people's minds. It seems to reduce men's lives to the level of a puppet play. But this is probably due to a misconception. The characters in a good play or story are not puppets; though Thackeray had a somewhat irritating habit of speaking of his as if they were. Wordsworth's criticism on Goethe has often been quoted, that his work was 'not inevitable enough.' The criticism has been challenged; and it does not seem to me that it could properly be applied to the best of Goethe's writings; but I suppose what was meant was that some of them were too elaborately planned, so that they were too obviously Goethe's work, and not the spontaneous utterances of the characters that were being represented. So far as this was true, it would be a serious defect. Cer-

tainly no one could make any criticism of this kind on the plays of Shakespeare. When Falstaff says, 'Thou hast done much harm upon me, Hal. . . . Before I knew thee, Hal, I knew nothing, and now am I . . . little better than one of the wicked,' one realizes that it is Falstaff who says this, and that it is not something invented for him by Shakespeare. Even Thackeray was sometimes surprised by the utterances of his so-called puppets; and George Eliot has told of at least one case in which the words of some of her characters came to her as if from without.[1] So, too, even if all the men and women in the world are merely players, yet the parts that they play are genuinely their own. If the prophets and poets are inspired by the Absolute, they are at least inspired in their own peculiar way. The Absolute does not speak through Carlyle in the same fashion as through Browning or Keats; and those of us who are cast for smaller parts have also an individuality of our own. But we shall have occasion to return to this subject at a later stage. In the meantime, what has been stated with reference to potentiality leads to a consideration of the doctrine of evolution, which is the subject of our next chapter.

[1] See on this Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii., pp. 221-2.

KANT complained that in his time, metaphysics had not yet entered upon 'the sure path of science.' Since that time it has become a little more doubtful than it then appeared whether there is any quite sure path in science. Even mathematical science has been to a considerable extent revolutionized. Similarly, the scientific doctrine of evolution appears to be still in a somewhat uncertain position; but the general idea of it, especially in its application to human life, is pretty firmly established, and has to be taken into account here.

The general conception of evolution is prominent in several of the early Greek philosophies—most notably in that of Anaximander[1]; and it can be readily connected with the Aristotelian doctrine of potentiality and actuality, though it does not appear to have been definitely so connected by Aristotle himself. There are traces of it also in some of the early philosophies of India. In more modern thought it was for a long time obscured by the prevalent doctrine of a sudden act of creation. It began to be revived, somewhat tentatively, by certain biologists in the latter part of the eighteenth century, such as Buffon and Erasmus Darwin; and some valuable suggestions towards it were made by St. Hilaire and Goethe. Lamarck, however, ought perhaps to be regarded as the first who gave

[1] See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, chap. i.

it a definite scientific form; but it was Charles Darwin, supported by Russel Wallace, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and others, who set it on a firm footing, and won for it a general acceptance. It is now coming to be recognized that the particular form that was given to the doctrine by Charles Darwin is somewhat one-sided; and we have to notice some of the more recent developments of the conception, and especially the way in which the views of Lamarck, with modifications, have again been brought into greater prominence.

The general defect of the theory of Charles Darwin, which causes it to have comparatively little philosophical interest, lies in the fact that it is so largely concerned with the problem of *survival* as to throw but little light on that of *origin*. Its dominant conception is that of the 'struggle for existence' and 'survival of the fittest'—'fittest' meaning simply *fittest to survive*. The 'struggle' referred to is, in the main, that between different varieties of the same general type; and no doubt such struggles do take place between rival types of plants and animals, as well as between different races of mankind, different types of social and political organization, different methods of organization, even different tendencies in music, painting and poetry, and rival schools of philosophy. Through such rivalry it is no doubt true that there is a gradual elimination of the inefficient and conservation of those that are best adapted to their conditions. But the consideration of these struggles and survivals throws but little light on

the generation of the types between which the struggle takes place. Darwin was, on the whole, too ready to be content with the description of the divergent types as 'chance variations'—an expression that has been taken literally by Dr. Schiller[1] and others, and has encouraged the recognition of 'contingency' in nature. There may be a sense in which contingency has to be recognized as an aspect of reality; but, in general, the aim of science is to find some explanatory principle for everything that occurs; and this is, even more emphatically, the aim of philosophy. In the case of different modes of human life, different forms of government, different schools of art or philosophy, etc., it is clear that some explanation of the divergent types can generally be discovered; and we are naturally led to expect that some explanation of the different types of plant and animal life could also be discovered. Now, Lamarck seems to have provided a more definite explanation of the origin of variations than is readily to be discovered in the work of Darwin; and this is the source of the persistent vitality of his work.[2] What he called attention to may, indeed, also be described as a

[1] See especially his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in 1922.

[2] It should be borne in mind that Herbert Spencer, though in the main a whole-hearted follower of Charles Darwin, was not unaware of the insufficiency of his leading conception, and gave considerable support, especially in his book on *The Factors of Organic Evolution*, to the earlier theory of Lamarck. Perhaps his work has hardly received sufficient recognition ; but this is a question for biologists to consider.

'struggle for existence,' but not a struggle between rival types—rather, in the language of Spinoza, a *conatus in suo esse perseverari*, an effort to preserve its own being. The stock illustration is the long neck of the giraffe, which is supposed to have been acquired in the effort to reach up to the leaves on lofty trees. It was thought for a time that this view had been rendered untenable by the doctrine of Weismann, according to which 'acquired characters' are not inherited. It was contended that, even if some giraffes lengthened their necks in the way suggested, the long necks would not be transmitted to their posterity. It was also thought that the idea of variation by conscious effort, even if applicable to animals, could hardly have any significance in the case of plants. It was known that there are such things as 'sensitive plants'; but it was commonly supposed that these were little more than freaks. It is now coming to be seen, through the researches of Sir Francis Darwin and others, that plants are much more sensitive to their surroundings than had previously been supposed, and much more capable of adjusting themselves to the conditions in which they live. The remarkable work of Sir J. C. Bose[1] seems to suggest that an element of sensitivity can be traced even below the definitely organic level, thus confirming some of the speculations of Haeckel and even the humorous paradoxes of Samuel Butler.[2] Also, it seems to be

[1] See the account of it by Professor Patrick Geddes.

[2] In connection with this, Mr. Shaw's entertaining Preface to *Back to Methuselah* may be read with advantage.

now recognized that the denial of the possibility of the transmission of acquired characteristics was somewhat too rigorously expressed. They may not be as readily transmitted as those that are innate; but it seems now to be admitted that they may have some influence for the generations that succeed. And the great discoveries of Mendel have tended to convince biologists that 'chance' at least has no place in heredity. Thus the way is prepared for a more philosophical conception of the general process of development, and especially for the recognition that the apprehension of value may have some part in it, even below the human level. That it plays a part in human development is too obvious to call for special emphasis.

The philosophical conception of evolution, as has been already noted, is to be found to some extent in early Oriental speculations, in which a double process of involution and evolution is more or less definitely indicated; but the particular way in which these processes were conceived has not any very direct interest from the point of view of modern thought. Greek speculation came nearer to our way of thinking. The general tendency of the early Greek thinkers was to start with simple elements (or elements that were supposed to be simple), such as fire, air, water and earth; and to regard all complex things as being developed from these by certain forces, such as attraction and repulsion, or, in the case of Anaxagoras, a kind of control that may be described as mental, but (as Socrates urged) without any definite recognition of

purpose. Anaximander seems to have had a fairly definite view of the way in which the forms of animal and human life might be supposed to have arisen from very simple species (probably at first living in water). The upward and downward path of Heraclitus was similarly thought of as a transition from water to fire, and then down again. There is a similar recognition of two opposite processes in the doctrine of Empedocles as to the influence of the forces described as those of Love and Strife. In general, however, there seems to have been a tendency in Greek thought to conceive of the downward path as coming first and most easily, and the upward path as calling for a special effort. This tendency appears, for instance, in Plato's view of the State as naturally tending to degenerate, and only being kept up by conscious effort through education and governmental control. That there is a considerable element of truth in this, is not altogether denied by modern science; but the idea of Natural Selection has been partly substituted for that of conscious control. In the case of human life this belittling of the element of conscious control has probably been to a large extent misleading, especially in the political writings of Herbert Spencer and his followers. The way in which Aristotle applied his conceptions of form and matter and potentiality and actuality to the ascending scale of living beings has been already to some extent referred to. His most fruitful application was in the case of human life. His view of society as arising first of all in the

struggle for simple existence and afterwards developing into the struggle for the best kind of existence was a very enlightening contribution to social philosophy and helped to indicate the way in which the conception of value tends to become dominant at least in the higher phases of the evolutionary process. In recent times such writers as Professors Bergson and Lloyd Morgan, by emphasizing the conception of evolution as 'creative' or 'emergent' have done much to promote a view of this kind both in biology and in philosophy.

The question that is of chief interest to us here is as to whether the processes that are found in nature, and more particularly in human nature, can be interpreted as pointing towards the realization of the highest values—whether it is on the whole true that what is fittest to survive is also the most worthy to be preserved. That it is so in human life seems to be to some extent obvious. Progress in the higher values seems to be on the whole apparent. Even a writer so little optimistic as Carlyle held that Might tends to be identical with Right. But it is only an idealistic system, such as that of Leibniz or that of Hegel, that seems capable of giving us any sure basis for such a belief.

THE terms Realism and Idealism, though very apt to be misleading, serve at least to mark a convenient distinction between opposing tendencies in philosophical interpretation. On the face of it, the universe of our experience has two opposite poles. At the one end are what we commonly class as purely material things, with simple mechanical interactions: at the other end are what we know as spiritual beings, having qualities that we not merely contemplate but enjoy, with vivid feelings of pleasure and pain, with definite purposes, and thoughts that wander through eternity. We may think of these distinguishable forms of being as opposite modes of existence, having in themselves no essential connection with one another. In that case we are Dualists. But few thinkers have found it possible to rest in simple dualism. Descartes was perhaps the best representative of it in modern times. But, though he recognized the separate existence of thinking and material substances, yet he at least conceived of the Divine Being as the creative and active principle underlying both; and his followers were gradually forced to break down the sharp distinction between the two. Most philosophers incline either towards Realism or towards Idealism—*i.e.*, they tend either to interpret the conscious life of

spiritual beings in terms of matter and motion or to interpret matter and motion in terms of spiritual activity. Now, spiritual beings, as we have already noted, are chiefly distinguished from other modes of existence by the fact that they have conscious purposes, in which they are more or less definitely guided by some idea of good; in other words, by the fact that they pursue values. Thus we may say that the most fundamental problem in philosophy lies in the question whether our universe is to be interpreted in terms of value or in terms of mechanical movement, or whether these two aspects are to be recognized as fundamentally distinct or even more or less opposed to each other. Those who incline to the first position are idealists; those who incline to the second are realists; those who incline to the third are dualists. But most philosophers cannot, without considerable qualification, be definitely placed in any of these groups. Unfortunately the terms are highly ambiguous. Realism was for a long time understood to mean simply that universals are real. In this sense it was opposed to Nominalism and Conceptualism. The chief upholder of Realism, in this sense, was generally supposed to be Plato, who is also commonly regarded as the chief founder of Idealism. But in recent times Realism has been most often understood as referring to the independent reality of the things that are contemplated, as distinguished from the minds that contemplate them; and, in this connection, a good deal turns on the degree of emphasis that is to be laid on 'indepen-

dent.' Idealism is sometimes understood to mean the theory that the material system exists only within the individual minds that apprehend or contemplate it—a view that Plato and most other idealists have repudiated. It can hardly be said that even Berkeley went quite as far as that, though he sometimes expressed himself as if he did. Those who incline to this extreme are sometimes called Sensationalists; but with them we are not here particularly concerned. It is, however, largely in opposition to this doctrine that contemporary Realism has been developed. Hence, when such terms as Realism and Idealism are used, it is important to notice the exact sense in which they are employed. Mr. F. H. Bradley is generally recognized as our leading idealist at the present time; yet he has himself stated that he does not know whether his final conclusion should be described as realistic or as idealistic. Professor Alexander, on the other hand, is commonly reckoned as a realist, and he appears to be willing to be so described; and, among those who are classed as realists, he is the one who has made the most remarkable attempt to give a systematic account of the structure of our universe; but, in its final outcome, it is not altogether easy to make any sharp distinction between his position and that of some of those that are commonly described as idealistic. On the whole, instead of speaking of Realism and Idealism, it might be better to point to realistic and idealistic tendencies in the writings of leading philosophers. On any view, our universe appears to be a highly

complex system; and most writers find it difficult to interpret it in a purely realistic or in a purely idealistic way. Some historical references, however, may help us to see where the chief problems lie; and, in particular, what is the place of the conception of Value in relation to these problems.

The antithesis comes out in a rather striking way in the contrast between the early speculations in India, on the one hand, represented by the Upanishads and later commentaries upon them, and, on the other hand, the early philosophy of Greece. It is, no doubt, somewhat difficult for a modern Western reader to arrive at any full appreciation of either of these ways of thinking. Indian philosophy, in spite of all that has been written about it, remains somewhat dark to most English readers—among others, to the present writer. Even when the words seem to have been intelligibly rendered into English, it is difficult to be sure that one has really got inside the minds of those who uttered them. Happily a beginning has now been made in the interpretation of Indian philosophy for English readers by Indian scholars themselves. The two histories by Professors Das Gupta and Radhakrishnan, of which the first volumes have recently been published, should do much, at least when they are completed, to enlighten the Western mind on the subject. It has been said, I think justly, that these two books open up a new epoch in the interpretation of Indian thought. The former of the two is chiefly remarkable for the thoroughness of its scholarship and the latter for its

strenuous, even if not wholly successful, effort to show the connection between Indian and European speculations. Greek philosophy has also been made much more accessible to English readers, especially by the recent works of Professor Burnet.

On the whole, in spite of the fact that there have been pronounced Atheists and Materialists in India, it seems true to say that most of the speculations there — perhaps more particularly the earliest of them, which have continued to have a great influence on more recent modes of thought — have been dominated by the idea of Spirit as the underlying reality beneath the appearances of nature and human life. Even the Founder of Buddhism, who is generally classed as an Atheist,[1] appears to have directed his criticisms mainly against the conception of a persistent substance, whether applied to human personalities or to any higher powers. In this respect his philosophy seems to have borne a considerable resemblance to that of David Hume.[2] But, in general, the philosophy of India may be described as idealistic, tending to the recognition of some spiritual power, whether conceived as a Person or as an incomprehensible Absolute, as the true Reality behind its more or less illusory manifestations in the particular objects that constitute the realm of Mâya.

[1] The whole of the Buddhist school is so classed by Professor Das Gupta.

[2] An Indian thinker of some prominence told me that David Hume and Mr. F. H. Bradley were the only British philosophers who seemed to him to have much importance.

There are traces of similar ideas in Greek speculation—especially perhaps in the Eleatic school; but, in general, the early Greek philosophers began with the study of material principles, such as water, fire, air and the like. Even when more spiritual conceptions, such as mind, or love and strife, were introduced, they tended to think of these on the analogy of physical forces. Their most definite outcome along this line seems, as we have already noted, to be found in the school of the Atomists. Against this, no doubt, we have to set the school of the Pythagoreans, who are at least supposed by some to have been influenced by Eastern conceptions, and who concentrated their attention on the more purely formal or mathematical aspects of things, and thus prepared the way for the doctrine of Forms that was afterwards elaborated, under the influence of Socrates, by Plato and Aristotle. Socrates, as we have already noted, emphasized the formal aspect in relation to the conception of Mind as the supreme governing principle, a view that was at least partly derived from the teaching of Anaxagoras. This view was interpreted, it would seem, both by Socrates himself and by Plato as meaning that the ultimate interpretation of all things is to be found in the Form of Good, which seems to be almost equivalent to what we should describe as the idea of spiritual value. It is from this that practically all the forms of modern Idealism have been, more or less consciously, derived.

The difficulty of Plato's idealism lies in seeing

how the particular facts of nature and human life —many of which seem to have a negative, rather than a positive value—are to be accounted for in the light of the Form of the Good. If the general account of the creative process given in the *Timæus*—which some regard as only a statement of certain Pythagorean speculations—is to be taken as expressing Plato's own view, the difficulty appears to be evaded by falling back upon dualism.[1] The creative Intelligence is represented there as aiming at the best, but failing to realize it on account of the imperfect material with which It has to work. This way of putting it may have been intended only as a pictorial representation; but, if so, it is difficult to see what would be left when the picture is removed.

But all this is ancient history. When we come to the beginning of what is commonly reckoned as modern philosophy, we find that it was characterized by a more or less definite revolt against the thought of Plato and Aristotle (especially the latter). Bacon even went so far as to refer to their doctrines as the light things that had been carried down by the stream of time, as contrasted with the more weighty thinking of the Atomists, which had sunk to the bottom. But the real beginning of modern speculation is found in the philosophy of Descartes, to which reference has

[1] This would not have appeared to be a serious difficulty from the Pythagorean point of view, for their general doctrine seems to have been essentially dualistic. Aristotle's philosophy also can hardly be regarded otherwise than as dualistic.

already been made. His conception of three fundamental types of substance—finite minds, the spatial system of material being, and the infinite Mind creating and controlling both—was soon seen to involve insuperable (or almost insuperable) difficulties, especially with reference to the interaction between mind and matter; and these difficulties were, in the end, removed by Spinoza's theory of the one infinite Substance, containing infinite attributes and modes both infinite and finite. This conception, with modifications, has formed the basis of a good deal of recent philosophy, both realistic and idealistic. Professor Alexander's philosophy is confessedly based on this, but is given a more realistic turn by the substitution of Time for Mind.[1] Bosanquet's philosophy also bears very considerable traces of the influence of Spinoza. But, if either of these philosophies is to be affiliated to that of Spinoza, it must be recognized that the general conceptions of Spinoza have been in both of them greatly modified by the influence of subsequent developments of science and philosophy. The chief modifications that were made on Spinoza's conceptions were those that resulted from the great line of German philosophers, especially Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel; and these all tended in the idealistic direction.

Spinoza's own philosophy cannot be very definitely classed either as idealistic or realistic. On

[1] See, with reference to this, Professor Alexander's little book on *Spinoza and Time* (Allen and Unwin).

the whole, he may be said to have held the balance pretty evenly between them. The idea of value plays, in his completed system, a comparatively subordinate part; though, in the account that he gave of the way in which he was led to construct it, he explains that his object was to find the supreme Good. He connected the idea of Good very closely with that of desire; and he held, in general, that people do not desire things because they are good, but rather count them good because they desire them. Now, the real or supreme good is not that which men, in general, desire. It seems to be conceived by Spinoza on the whole somewhat in the Oriental fashion, not as that which positively satisfies desire, but rather as that in which desire ceases. It is, however, conceived as absolutely perfect; but its perfection is of such a kind as necessarily to include imperfection. It is in the recognition of this perfection that we attain to peace. Professor Alexander modifies this by thinking of a process of evolution towards perfection; and, in so thinking, he appears to me (though he describes himself as a realist) to have made the doctrine of Spinoza more idealistic. Bosanquet, on the other hand, though classed as an idealist, appears to me to be essentially nearer to the Spinozistic position.

Among earlier thinkers, Leibniz modified the view of Spinoza in a definitely idealistic direction. Instead of thinking of a single all-comprehensive Substance, he thought rather of a number of distinct 'Monads'; and he conceived that these are

under the control of one supreme Monad, which aims at the best. But the best, as Leibniz conceived, could not be realized in the world of finite Monads — not, as with Plato or Timæus, on account of an imperfect material, but rather because the supreme Good is complex, and is split up into a variety of elements that are not all 'compossible.' Hence we can only look for the best that is *possible* in the finite world. Perhaps this conception indicates the way to a true solution; but Leibniz does not appear to have succeeded in making it clear why it is that the conception of supreme Good has to be split up into parts that are not compossible.

Kant, who began as a follower of Leibniz, contributed something to the clearing up of this difficulty. He distinguished between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds. The phenomenal world is the spatio-temporal system; and, so long as we are within that system, we are only in the realm of effort, which implies evil; but, through our conflict with the imperfections of the world in which we live, we are capable of realizing the beautiful in art and the sublime by obedience to the moral law. The noumenal realm is incomprehensible by us; but we may suppose that in it all difficulties are removed and all contradictions solved. This view approximates pretty closely to the Oriental conception of an absolute Reality behind the world of Mâya; and it was more definitely developed in that direction by Schopenhauer.

Hegel returned to a more definitely idealistic

conception, but did not specially emphasize the idea of Value. His contention was that we must think of what is actual as being rational; but the nature of rationality has to be interpreted by a series of fundamental conceptions or thought-determinations, commonly referred to as categories. He seeks to give an account of these in his Logic. Nature has to be thought of as the particularization of these universal conceptions; and finite spirits, emerging from this world of particularization, advance towards the apprehension of the whole as a perfectly rational order.

This is a very difficult theory, and not only calls for more explanation than can be offered here, but probably more than Hegel himself has provided. Hence it has only been partially accepted by most subsequent idealists; and any more partial form of idealism leaves some serious problems unsolved. Hence it is not surprising that in recent times there has been a tendency to fall back upon theories of a more realistic type. The most fully elaborated of these are those that have been developed by Mr. Bertrand Russell and Professor Alexander; and to these I must now very briefly refer.

Mr. Russell's theory has been developed largely from the mathematical point of view. He applies mathematical conceptions with great freedom to the treatment of concrete problems; and in some previous chapters doubts have been suggested with regard to the legitimacy of such applications. I have also indicated an important point at which he seems to have failed to realize a serious difficulty

that was emphasized by Kant. One of the remarkable features of his theory and of that of others who are associated with him, is that the type of realism set forth by them is not only realism, as opposed to subjective idealism, but is also realism in the sense in which Plato was a realist, and consequently is not very far removed from the Platonic type of idealism, which also was developed very largely from the point of view of mathematics. But, while accepting the general doctrine of Forms or Universals, Mr. Russell is conscious of the difficulty of reducing these under any such general conception as that of the Form of Good. Hence he is led to deny that we are entitled to regard the world of our experience as a universe at all. He prefers to speak of it as a pluriverse; and this implies that the conception of Value or the Good cannot be taken as a supreme interpretative principle. He regards that conception as one of great importance in human life, and as the basis of what he describes as the 'Free Man's Worship.' But we have no reason, according to him, to suppose that the spatio-temporal system is of such a nature as to lead to the realization of the supreme Good. Rather he is inclined to take a pessimistic view of that system on the ground, if I understand him rightly, of what is described as the degradation of energy. It is chiefly for this reason that he has to be characterized as a realist, not merely in the sense in which Plato was one, but also in the sense that is opposed to the Platonic type of idealism and perhaps to any type of it.

The theory of Professor Alexander has already been referred to; and it seems to me to approximate to idealism more closely than that of Mr. Russell. It is idealistic in so far as he thinks of the spatio-temporal system as in process of evolution towards the highest form of spiritual perfection, described as Deity. It cannot quite be called idealism, however, inasmuch as what is taken as the fundamental principle of explanation is not this spiritual perfection to which the process leads, but rather the pure Space-Time from which it is supposed to spring. The idea that is expressed in the phrase κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον does not appear to be contained in his system.

My object in this chapter has been to bring out the importance of a right understanding of the conception of Value, with the view of seeing whether the main difficulty in the way of an idealistic system can be removed. It is evident that that difficulty lies in what is known as the problem of evil. If the universe is to be interpreted by the Form of Good, *i.e.*, by the conception of supreme Value, the question at once arises, How does it come that there is even the appearance of evil in it? As Dr. McTaggart has urged, the presence of a single pain or a single ungenerous thought would be enough to show that the world as we know it is not wholly good; and it is only too abundantly clear that such experiences are of common occurrence in human life. The question for idealism is —Can this apparent presence of evil in our universe be reconciled with any view that interprets that

universe in the light of the supreme Value? If not, we must be content with some realistic or dualistic or even pluralistic conception; or, if these also fail, we must fall back upon some form of scepticism or agnosticism.

If idealism were to fail, it seems to me, on the whole, that our most obvious refuge would be found in some such form of realism as that to which Mr. Russell inclines,[1] rather than in such a form as that which has been elaborated by Professor Alexander. For, as I have already indicated, it seems to be only on the basis of some form of idealism that such an evolutionary process as Professor Alexander describes would be capable of intelligible explanation. But even Mr. Russell's realism would have to be purged, I suspect, of some of the more mystical elements that are involved in it. Or perhaps we might resort to some type of Pragmatism or Humanism, which might, I think, be characterized as a sort of practical idealism without metaphysical foundation. But my hope is that it may be found possible to justify a thorough-going idealism. In order to do this, however, we must try to gain a clear understanding of what Value really means—which is not as easy as it might at first appear.

[1] I say 'inclines,' because his view does not appear to be very definitely fixed.

BOOK II

THEORIES OF VALUE

WHAT has been stated in the preceding Book may serve sufficiently to indicate the importance of the conception of Value, both in itself and as an interpretative principle in a system of Philosophy. Its significance has, however, been somewhat obscured by ambiguities in its use and by the fact that some other terms have often been employed in its place. In particular, as we have already noted, its place has sometimes been taken by the term 'Good.' Some part of its meaning has also sometimes been given under the conception that is expressed by the term 'Ought.' We have seen how the idea of Good was emphasized by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Kant, on the other hand, was chiefly responsible for laying the emphasis on what ought to be, as opposed to what actually exists. Good, Value, Ought evidently express closely related conceptions. But in recent times it is on Value that the chief emphasis has been laid; and it may be well at this point to indicate what are the grounds for this change. This may help us to clear up the meaning which the various terms have been intended to express.

The first reason for seeking to avoid the use of the term 'Good' is that it has a considerable degree of ambiguity. 'Good,' and especially 'Goodness,' is often understood in the sense of Benevo-

lence, which means the will or desire directed to what is good. When Kant declared that 'the only thing that can be called good without qualification is the good will,' the statement may be held to be tautological if 'good' *means* good will. On the other hand, to say that a good will means *a will directed towards good will*, is a statement that appears to carry us round in a circle. Kant sought to avoid this circle by distinguishing between the 'supreme good' and the 'complete good.' The good will, he held, is the *supreme* good; but the *complete* good includes happiness as well. This is a view that we are not, at this point, in a position to discuss. I refer to it only as showing that there is some ambiguity in the term. There is no similar ambiguity in the term 'Value,' which does not at least carry any *direct* suggestion of willing or being desired.

Further, if goodness is taken to mean benevolence, and benevolence is taken to mean the will to promote happiness, we are evidently using a term that commits us to certain theories that ought not to be accepted without careful consideration. The zealous seeker for truth or the artist who produces beautiful objects may be seeking to promote human happiness; but some at least would be inclined to think that Truth and Beauty are, in a wide sense, good, without reference to any happiness that may result from their attainment. This again is a question that I do not wish at this point to prejudge. I only seek to indicate that the use of the term 'good,' in so far as it means benevolence, suggests

a particular theory which ought not to be accepted without careful discussion. On the other hand, if we simply say that Truth and Beauty have *value*, we are not committing ourselves to any particular theory with regard to the kind of value that they possess.

Another great advantage in the use of the term Value is that it enables us, without any difficulty, to recognize *degrees*. 'Good' is too suggestive of something absolute and unquestionable; and, in dealing with things and persons that are finite and imperfect, we can seldom feel justified in the ascription of such an absolute characteristic. Even the Christ, with all the lofty claims that he appeared to assert, was unwilling to be characterized as good: 'There is none good but One, that is God.' But all things and all persons, however limited and incomplete they may be, can be recognized as having some degree of *Value* (or *Worth*—a term often treated as equivalent). To express degrees of goodness we have to introduce quite different words—good, *better*, *best;* and this inconvenience is not peculiar to English, but appears in almost every language. Even when we wish to speak of goodness in action, we again have to resort to a different word: we say that a man does *well*. Now, what we seek is, in general, the *best*, which is often very different from what may, in some limited sense, be called good; and what we actually secure is usually only the better, sometimes only the best of bad alternatives. Even 'the better,' according to the proverbial expres-

sion, is often 'the enemy of the good.' Also, to express the opposite of what is good, we are again compelled to use quite different verbal forms—Good and *Bad*, or Good and *Evil*, and again Better and *Worse*. The term Value is free from these inconveniences. It does not suggest anything absolute and unqualified. It is easily recognized that there may be more or less in value; and there is no difficulty in speaking of values that are positive or negative.

It was largely owing to this difficulty in the use of the term Good that Nietzsche was led to conceive of some excellence that should be 'beyond Good and Evil'; just as the ambiguity in the term 'moral' led him and others to describe themselves as 'immoralists'—a term which was by no means intended to imply that they did not acknowledge any ethical ideals. But neither Nietzsche nor any others have sought to get beyond Value. What they have suggested with regard to that is only that our conceptions of value need some revision. There must, according to Nietzsche, be an '*Umwertung aller Werte*,' a transvaluation of all values; and of course we know that such transmutations are of frequent occurrence in the development of human experience. They can, no doubt, be referred to in terms of 'good.' 'Time,' as Lowell said, 'makes ancient good uncouth'; but this at least sounds more paradoxical than the statement that the values of things, and the values of modes of thought and action, become changed by change of circumstance.

What has to be urged, in general, is that Value is a much more fluid and adaptable expression than Good; and in a world of many changes and varying relations, this is an undeniable advantage. The adaptability of the term shows itself in many ways. It is a noun, but it can also be used as a verb. Not only do things have value, but we value them; and we thus readily see that there is both a subjective and an objective aspect in the ascription of value. We can also say that things are valuable, and thus recognize that it is a quality with which we are dealing, though it is capable of being abstracted from the objects to which it is referred. Good, on the other hand, has no corresponding verb. When we want to say that we appreciate it, we have to resort to such terms as value or appreciation; and, when we turn it into a substantive, and speak of 'the Good,' we seem to be hypostatizing an abstraction. In the philosophy of Plato this defect is very apparent. We could hardly be tempted to speak of 'the Value,' in any similar fashion.

Besides the conception of Good, there is another that has played a large part in the discussion of ethical and social problems—that of what *ought to be*, as contrasted with what actually *is*. Here again it is to Kant that we have chiefly to look for the emphasis on this antithesis. It is to him that we owe the conception of a Categorical Imperative, which is set over against our natural inclinations, and even against the possibilities of achievement in the world as we know it. Kant's antithesis arose

partly from a somewhat cynical view of human nature and partly from the general theory of an unbridgeable gulf between the phenomenal world and the demands of reason. In German the antithesis, between what ought to be and what is, is somewhat sharper than it is in English; since *Sollen*, the German equivalent for *Ought*, suggests not only what is better than the existing thing, but also something that is always in the future. But even in England people are often apt to think that what is ideal must always be something in front of us, like the carrot by which an obstinate donkey is sometimes tempted forward; or, let us rather say, as if the poetic light that serves as our inspiration must always be a 'light that never was on sea or land.'[1] It was against this way of thinking that Hegel entered his emphatic protest; and many of his followers—notably Dr. Bosanquet—have given fresh force to his criticisms. He urged that 'the rational is actual,' meaning, as I understand it, that what has genuine value for human life tends, on the whole, to be pursued and more or less successfully achieved by us. He may sometimes have overstressed this; just as perhaps Socrates overstressed the doctrine that no man is willingly deprived of the good; and just as perhaps Carlyle overstressed his favourite contention that Right is always Might. Most original writers are apt to give undue emphasis to the ideas that seem to them to have been neglected. But I believe it will be

[1] Dr. Bosanquet has well called attention to the way in which this phrase of Wordsworth is liable to be misunderstood.

found that all these great sayings, when carefully interpreted, contain a very solid core of truth; and even those who are not prepared to admit this will surely at least allow that it is well to have a neutral term like Value which carries no direct suggestion either of achievement or of failure, but only the suggestion of something that is *worthy to be achieved.*

At any rate, in view of what has now been stated, it can hardly seem surprising that the conception of Value has taken a very prominent place in recent philosophy, not merely in some particular schools of thought, but practically in all schools. Those who have been specially influenced by Kant have naturally followed him in setting up the idea of Value or Worth as the supreme principle of determination in human life. The ethical movement in religion has been a good deal influenced by this way of thinking. The pursuit of the supreme values tends to be opposed, not only to dogmatic theology, but even to constructive metaphysics and the realistic interpretation of history. Pragmatism and Humanism connect closely with this attitude. Value tends to become, from these points of view, not merely the guiding principle in practical life, but also in the interpretation of truth. The more pluralistic types of Idealism, such as that of Dr. James Ward, are closely related to the same attitude. But even the Absolutism of such a writer as Dr. Bosanquet assigns a high place to the conception of Value, though it identifies the supreme standard of Value with ultimate Reality. On the

whole, it is clear that in all the more idealistic types of philosophy the conception of Value has a central position. But the emphasis on Value is hardly less marked in the more realistic schools. One of the most eloquent affirmations of its significance is given in Mr. Russell's account of the Free Man's Worship; and it has also been much emphasized by Professor Alexander, Dr. G. E. Moore, Mr. Santayana, and others. Meinong also, who ought perhaps to be regarded as the chief founder of the neo-realistic school, has contributed a very thorough discussion of the conception of Value; and he has been followed in this by his eminent fellow-worker, Dr. Ehrenfels. The work of Dr. Urban has been largely influenced by them. These Austrian writers are closely connected with Böhm-Bawerk and other representatives of the Austrian School of economists, who have done much to elucidate the conception of Value and its significance from the economic point of view. British economists also have given increasing attention to the determination of value, not exclusively from the point of view of the market. In this they have been to some extent assisted by the pungent criticisms of Ruskin, as well as by the discussions of the philosophical utilitarians. To most of these we shall have occasion to refer more definitely in the sequel. But enough has now been said to indicate the far-reaching significance of the general conception, and to show the importance of gaining, as far as possible, a clear understanding of its meaning.

When we begin to think about Value, one of the first things that are brought to our notice is that our attitude, as human beings, is not one of peaceful attainment, but rather one of effort and strife. We are not 'beyond Good and Evil,' but are constantly being reminded that one thing is better than another, and that it is often necessary to put forth a strenuous endeavour to secure the better and avoid the worse. The word Value directs attention to this. It is connected with 'avail,' 'valid,' 'valour,' which all imply some striving towards an end that is not yet attained, and that cannot be attained without effort. When Scott asks in *Marmion* 'What 'vails the vain knight-errant's brand?' we have an illustration of what is first suggested by the conception. What is valued is what *avails* in the struggle of life, what helps us forward towards some distant goal. No doubt, that goal might be still more highly valued; and we shall have to inquire whether the ultimate value may not be found in some beatific vision in which the soul can find rest. Even in our ordinary life we do find intervals of repose; yet it seems true to say that most of the things we value are valued for the help they give in a forward movement.

When we consider the terms 'valid,' 'value,' and 'valour,' we see that they correspond pretty closely to what are commonly accepted as the three main aspects of our conscious life—the knowing, the feeling, and the active attitudes. A valid argument is one that avails in the effort to prove; a valiant action is one that avails for the succour of

life; a valuable painting is one that is felt to be availing for ends that cannot be so easily characterized. But we shall have to consider at a later stage how far it is correct to represent value as being specially connected with feeling.

It may be well to note here that the term Worth —corresponding, in its origin, to the German *Wert*, but often used rather as equivalent to *Würde* —has some small advantages in comparison with Value. It can be used as an adjective—worth so much, worth more, worth while, etc.—but is not so flexible and much more ambiguous, being often used with reference to personal qualities that are strictly *invaluable;* as in the expression, 'Worth makes the man.' It may have some connection with *werden*, to become, and, if so, may be regarded as conveying a certain suggestion of growth—as in the phrase 'woe worth the day,' *i.e.*, woe has come of the day. But this is very doubtful, if not even certainly erroneous.[1] At any rate, it is somewhat fanciful to dwell much, as Carlyle and Ruskin were rather fond of doing, upon these verbal suggestions. They do not carry us very far; but some of them may furnish us with a convenient starting point, and may thus avail a little. They serve at least to remind us that a great deal of what we value, or what we regard as having worth, is not to be regarded as anything in which we can finally rest, but only as something that is useful as a stage in our growth. What we are growing towards,

[1] Etymologists seem to agree that the two uses of 'worth' have no real connection with each other.

what is the goal to which we strive, is not so easy to discern.

What is thus valued, as helping us on our way forward, is generally desired. Food, for instance, is desired as an instrument of growth and preservation; and what is thus desired we think of as being good. But often we desire things and think of them as good without reference to the way in which they avail or help us. Many people, for instance, have a craving for drink, and regard it as good, even though they may know very well that it does not really help them. Spinoza, as we have already noted, generalized this attitude by saying that we do not desire things because they are good, but rather we consider things to be good because we desire them. With this may be compared the saying of Aristotle, that the good has been well characterized as that at which all things aim. In such a case it would be erroneous to say that such things have value, if we mean by value what really helps us. Yet we can hardly avoid saying that we value them. Hence it is of some importance to distinguish between what *has value* and what *we value*. Valuation (*Wertung*) is not always coincident with value (*Wert*); or, in Sidgwick's language, what is *desired* is not always *desirable*. When Nietzsche spoke of the 'transvaluation of all values' (*Umwertung aller Werte*), we must understand him to mean an alteration in our valuations, not a change in the values themselves; though, of course, by a change of circumstances, this also might be brought about.

From what has now been stated it appears that what has true value, or what is really good, is not simply to be identified with what is desired or chosen, but only with what is chosen after careful reflection, or, in other words, with that which is an object of rational choice. In order to understand this qualification more clearly, it may be well to compare it with the way in which Kant sought to determine what is right in human conduct. He urged that, in order to determine whether a particular line of action is right, we have to ask ourselves whether, after careful reflection, we could wish that everyone else, under similar circumstances, should adopt the same line of action. In like manner, we may say that we are entitled to regard anything as truly good or really valuable when we not merely desire it for ourselves but approve of its being desired, under similar conditions, by everyone else. Even with this proviso, we may still be mistaken. A man who has a craving for drink may think it right both for himself and for others to gratify such a craving; and in this he may be quite mistaken. But, if he genuinely thinks this, he is really *valuing* and not merely desiring; but his valuing may still be in need of transvaluation. Such transvaluation would have to be brought about by *objective* considerations, not merely by subjective reflection. It might be brought about, for instance, by medical advice or by personal investigation of the influence of particular liquors on health, on capacity for work, and other vital considerations.

It may be well at this point to consider somewhat more definitely the significance of Nietzsche's phrase about the 'transvaluation of values.' What he had in mind was the kind of transformation that is apt to take place in our desires when there is some alteration in our general outlook upon the world. In another connection,[1] I have referred to such transformations as changes in our 'universe of desires.' The point is that our desires and valuations are not, in general, isolated aspects of our conscious life, but hang together and form a more or less coherent system. An Indian sage and a British speculator on the Stock Exchange have not merely different desires and valuations, but their whole outlook on life is different; so that the desires of the one could hardly be made to fit into the consciousness of the other without a complete transformation of the general outlook. Such transformations do take place from time to time. A person on holiday or in a foreign country is sometimes a very different being from the same person at work among his normal surroundings. There is often a considerable change in a young man when he leaves school and goes to College, or when he leaves College and enters upon some professional work. John Bunyan may never have been quite as wicked as he would have us believe; but it is pretty certain that he enjoyed some things before his conversion which would not have had much appeal for him afterwards. The death of a friend, a failure in business, marriage, the winning

[1] *Manual of Ethics*, Book I., chap. i.

of a fortune, may bring about similar changes in desires and valuations. And it is not only in isolated individuals that such changes occur. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the outlook of whole nations before the European War was considerably different from what it has subsequently become. At any rate, it is not difficult to see that there have been several epochs in the past in which such transformations have taken place. It may be well to refer definitely to some of these.

One of the most notable instances of such transvaluations would appear to have begun in various countries about six centuries before the Christian era. We might perhaps even say that it was about that time that definite valuations on a large scale first began. It is doubtful at least whether much before that time there was any clear appreciation of the great conceptions of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. They were brought to light through the political, religious, literary, philosophical and artistic developments that gradually arose in Egypt, Babylonia, Judæa, India, and other countries, and that reached their culmination in Greece between the years 600 and 300 B.C. Before that time, no doubt, there were appreciations of sensuous joys and pains, there were superstitious terrors and adulations, there was the glory of power and there was slavish prostration before it, and there were sporadic glimpses of what are now recognized as the higher values. But the advance that was made within the three centuries to which I have referred seems to have been so great that everything that

has happened since, so far as it concerns the apprehension of the higher values, appears comparatively trivial. We have hardly succeeded in recapturing the visions of beauty that were then created; our apprehension of truth has been extended in detail, but not much deepened in its more essential features; it is only in goodness that we can lay claim to any striking development, and even then with some hesitation. Such a growth in the recognition of the higher values as then took place must have involved great transvaluations. The things previously valued must have seemed trivial and almost contemptible. Men in general—at least those who had any real share in the progress that was made (doubtless a somewhat limited number)—must have felt pretty much as the prisoners did whom Plato describes as emerging from the subterranean cavern and coming out into the light of day.

The next change that may be regarded as having a similarly far-reaching character was that which took place at the beginning of the Christian era; and this concerned almost exclusively the appreciation of goodness. It was not an altogether sudden change. Much of the deepening that took place in the valuation of goodness had been to some extent anticipated in India, Judæa, Greece, and elsewhere; but it can hardly be questioned that the spread of Christianity had a more potent influence than any previous movement of a similar kind. And it is very clear in this case that what was at first brought about was a thorough transvaluation.

The obvious way in which it had to be characterized was by the metaphor of re-birth. The 'natural man' had to be re-born as the 'spiritual'; and, at least at first, all that was previously valued seemed almost worthless. The 'kingdom of heaven' was sharply set up against the realm of Cæsar; the virtues of the Greeks began to look like 'splendid vices,' and those of the Pharisees like mere hypocrisy; the 'beauty of holiness' superseded all other graces; and 'the Truth' made all particular truths seem worthless. This was probably the most complete transvaluation that has ever been known in the history of the world; and it may be said to have worked itself out in Europe throughout a period of more than ten centuries, though of course it never prevailed among more than a limited section of the people. Its general significance is best expressed in the Beatitudes, in which lowliness, meekness, and adversity are set above the more forceful and triumphant modes of life. Goethe characterized it as the Worship of Sorrow.

Then we come to the two great movements that are commonly referred to as the Renaissance and the Reformation. These two movements were to a certain extent opposed to each other. The former meant mainly a return to the Greek and Roman valuations; whereas the latter was, on the whole, an attempt to revive the decaying spirit of Christianity. But the general result was to bring about some degree of conciliation between the two ideals. The Hellenism of the Renaissance was saturated

with Christian feeling; and the Christianity of the Reformation contained a considerable infusion of the Greek ideas of political freedom and rational investigation. I do not mean, of course, that this could be affirmed of every individual who was associated with either of these movements; but it seems clear that it became more and more true in the course of their development. Hence the valuations that were characteristic of this period must, on the whole, be regarded as being different both from those of ancient Greece and from those of primitive Christianity.

Next we find in Europe a period that is largely characterized, on the practical side, by rebellion and revolution, culminating in the great English rebellion and in the great Revolution in France; and, on the more speculative side, by intellectual doubt, best represented by Voltaire and Hume. This period corresponds to a considerable extent to that of the Sophists in Greece and, in practical life, to the type of Liberty and Equality represented in Plato's sketch of the Democratic State. But the modern doubts were more carefully reasoned and more limited in scope than their older prototypes; and most of our modern democrats, by adding Fraternity, have greatly transformed their outlook in theory, though in practice the difference is perhaps not very conspicuous.

The next period may be best characterized as that of the Superman. Goethe in Germany, Napoleon in France, Byron in England, are types of the potent personalities that now began to appear on

the stage of history, men of titanic force, largely free from conventional restraints and carried on by 'demonic' impulses to great achievements. Wagner became the musical exponent of this tendency, and Carlyle in his doctrine of Heroes brought out its more philosophical significance. In a more extreme form it shows itself in the utterances of Walt Whitman and Nietzsche; the latter of whom, as we have already noted, sought to explain the transvaluations that are implied in it. Many other names might also be mentioned, such as those of Schopenhauer and Emerson, who help to connect this heroic attitude with the Eastern identification of man with God, commonly expressed in the formula '*tat tuam asi.*' The megalomania of the Emperor William II. is perhaps rightly regarded as having some connection with the same attitude of mind. The whole character of this period may be taken as a confirmation of Plato's contention that a certain kind of tyranny tends to grow out of extreme democracy; but in this case both the democracy and the tyranny were more theoretical than practical. Carlyle thought of the general movement as an attempt to return to an Age of Faith after the doubts of the eighteenth century; but, if so, the result may be taken as an illustration of the saying that 'the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.' Goethe, no doubt, attained eventually to an almost statuesque calm; but Matthew Arnold's characterization of him is perhaps not altogether misleading:

> 'He was happy if to know
> Causes of things, and far below
> His feet to see the lurid flow
> Of terror and insane distress
> And headlong fate, be happiness.'

Emerson may have reached a more genuine serenity; but few at least of the others did. It remained, on the whole, a period of 'storm and stress,' in which many of the old valuations were thrown aside.

It is generally felt that the great War ought to mark the beginning of a new epoch; and Reconstruction has been accepted as its watchword. Of course, all periods have had their wreckage; and in all ages there have been some attempts to reconstruct; but there are certainly grounds for hoping that this great catastrophe may serve to give new vigour to such efforts. It is customary at least to date the successive periods in human history from such terrible events. What we may hope is that, as the preceding epoch was one of impressive characters and struggling nationalities, the new era may be one rather of co-operation in the pursuit of a common good. If so, it may be apt to seem somewhat commonplace. Its motto will be that which Browning expressed in *Paracelsus*—'Make no more giants, Lord, but elevate the race at once.' Neither men nor nations must seek to achieve any proud eminence over others. In this respect at least, it would involve a return to the Christian ideal—'If any would be chief among you, let him be your servant.' No doubt, this ideal has never

been altogether absent since the beginning of the Christian era. It was not even entirely unknown before that time. The highest type of man recognized in India has long been that of the renunciant. Plato's supreme rulers were to be without all the goods that are commonly prized. The true self-lover, according to Aristotle, is ready to give up everything—even the opportunity for noble action—to his friends, reserving only for himself the consciousness of having done what is right. And, of course, the Superman has also been thought of by many as a renunciant. '*Stirb und werde*,' 'Die to live,' was the motto of Goethe. Walt Whitman desired to have no privilege for which everyone else might not have an equivalent. If there is to be anything really new in the ideal of the coming time, it will presumably be a deeper sense of the need for active co-operation, not only between individuals, but between groups and nations. The conception of co-operative groups is one that has not yet been made adequately effective; and that is what we now have the opportunity of developing in all sorts of new directions. This also will involve some transformation of human valuations.

The changes that take place in our valuations do not, however, imply any transmutation of the values themselves. The change is chiefly in the emphasis that we lay upon them. We cannot invent values; we can only discover them. On the other hand, it has to be recognized that most values are relative. There is some soul of goodness in things evil; and even things that are not

counted evil depend for their values on the conditions in which they occur. The value of food, for example, is relative to the need of the person who takes it. Not only is it often true that 'one man's meat is another man's poison,' but, even for the same man, what is wholesome under certain conditions is not wholesome under others. Similarly, the higher values are subject to certain changes. A glimpse of truth which is of great value at one stage of intellectual development may, at a higher stage, be seen to be erroneous or misleading. Artistic values are liable to similar variations. A simple fairy tale may be artistically better for a child than *Hamlet* or *Faust*. Goodness also is not the same for all times and for all peoples. A degree of self-assertion that is commendable in a man who has knowledge and genius might be highly reprehensible in one more ignorant or less capable. *Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi;* and, we may add, *quod licet bovi non licet Jovi*, or *noblesse oblige*. Hence the persistence of real values can only be shown when the objects that are valued are considered in all their essential relations.

The general considerations that have been so far set forth may suffice to show the nature of the subject with which we are concerned, and to indicate some of the difficulties by which its treatment is beset. What we have next to do is to notice some important distinctions that have to be drawn either in the nature of the values that are to be dealt with or in the attitude of mind of those who value them. It is evident that, in valuing things, we use a

number of different expressions, such as value itself, which we have taken as the most general, worth, goodness, beauty, agreeableness, loveliness, utility, and the like, the exact meaning of which it is not always easy to determine. Again, it sometimes appears as if we ascribed values to particular objects, without any definite reference to the persons for whom they have value; whereas in other cases a reference to the attitude of specific persons appears to be necessary. Some things also, such as money, appear to be valued only indirectly, as means for the attainment of other objects, while others, such as beauty, appear to be valued directly. We have to consider such distinctions, and try to ascertain how far they are sound, and what their precise significance is. It seems best to begin with the distinction between things that are valued directly and those that are only instrumental for the attainment of ends different from themselves.

THAT many of the things we value are valued only as means to the attainment of other things, is almost self-evident. It is, indeed, so obvious that people are often led to doubt whether there is anything that can be said to have value or to be good without reference to some end, distinguishable from itself, which it subserves. This has been so much emphasized by Herbert Spencer, and so copiously illustrated by him, that it will probably be simplest for us here to quote some of the leading passages in his statement.[1]

'In which cases do we distinguish as good a knife, a gun, a house? And what trait leads us to speak of a bad umbrella or a bad pair of boots? The characters here predicated by the words good and bad, are not intrinsic characters; for apart from human wants, such things have neither merits nor demerits. We call these articles good or bad according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends. The good knife is one which will cut; the good gun is one which carries far and true; the good house is one which duly yields the shelter, comfort and accommodation sought for. Conversely, the badness alleged of the umbrella or the pair of boots, refers to their failures in fulfil-

[1] *Principles of Ethics*, vol. i., part i., 'The Data of Ethics,' part iii.

ling the ends of keeping off the rain and comfortably protecting the feet, with due regard to appearances. So it is when we pass from inanimate objects to inanimate actions. We call a day bad in which storms prevent us from satisfying certain of our desires. A good season is the expression used when the weather has favoured the production of valuable crops. If from lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones, we similarly find that these words in their current applications refer to efficient subservience. The goodness or badness of a pointer or a hunter, of a sheep or an ox, ignoring all other attributes of these creatures, refer in the one case to the fitness of their actions for effecting the ends men use them for, and in the other case to the qualities of their flesh as adapting it to support human life. And those doings of men which, morally considered, are indifferent, we class as good or bad according to their success or failure. A good jump is a jump which, remoter ends ignored, well achieves the immediate purpose of a jump; and a stroke at billiards is called good when the movements are skilfully adjusted to the requirements. Oppositely, the badness of a walk that is shuffling and an utterance that is indistinct, is alleged because of the relative non-adaptations of the acts to the ends.'

It may be noted that, in the instance of the jump, Spencer hardly seems to make his point clear. It might be urged that 'the immediate purpose of a jump' is simply that of being a 'good jump'; and, consequently, it might be maintained that, in

this case, the value expressed by the term 'good' is intrinsic. But, of course, there generally are some 'remoter ends' in jumping—clearing a ditch, winning a prize, exercising the limbs, displaying skill, *etc.*

'Apart from approval or disapproval of his ulterior aims,' Spencer proceeds a little later, 'a man who fights is said to make a good defence, if his defence is well adapted for self-preservation; and, the judgments on other aspects of his conduct remaining the same, he brings down on himself an unfavourable verdict, in so far as his immediate acts are concerned, if these are futile. The goodness ascribed to a man of business, as such, is measured by the activity and ability with which he buys and sells to advantage; and may co-exist with a hard treatment of dependents which is reprobated. Though in repeatedly lending money to a friend who sinks one loan after another, a man is doing that which, considered in itself, is held praiseworthy; yet, if he does it to the extent of bringing on his own ruin, he is held blameworthy for a self-sacrifice carried too far. And thus it is with the opinions we express from hour to hour on those acts of people around which bear on their health and personal welfare. "You should not have done that," is the reproof given to one who crosses the street amid a dangerous rush of vehicles. "You ought to have changed your clothes," is said to another who has taken cold after getting wet. "You were right to take a receipt"; "You were wrong to invest without advice," are common

criticisms. All such approving and disapproving utterances make the tacit assertion that, other things equal, conduct is right or wrong according as its special acts, well or ill adjusted to special ends, do or do not further the general end of self-preservation.'

By these illustrations Spencer is leading up to the view that the great end to which all instrumental values are subservient, is that of the preservation and enhancement of life; but that is a doctrine to which we shall have occasion to refer later. In the meantime, what is important to note is merely that at least a very large number of the objects and actions that are valued by us, that we commend or approve, are valued as means to some ulterior ends. In particular, those things that have a 'market value' or price fall into this class; and, as it is to such things that the term Value is most often applied, it may be well at this point to direct attention to the use of the conception of Value in Economics.

In economic writings the term Value is generally used in a somewhat restricted sense. '"Value" by itself,' says Professor Marshall,[1] 'always means value in exchange'; and the meaning of this is commonly given, in the language of Adam Smith, as 'the power of purchasing other goods which a particular object conveys.' This power, of course, is very variable, as the experiences of the great War have helped everyone to realize. The theory of Economics is very largely

[1] *Principles of Economics*, vol. i., p. 8.

occupied with the discussion of the conditions upon which these variations depend. With these we are not here specially concerned. It must suffice to take note of the general nature of those conditions. It has to be recognized, of course, that the value of objects in exchange depends primarily upon their serviceableness for particular purposes; but the serviceableness of a particular object is not a permanent quality that attaches to it, but depends on the special circumstances in which it is used. There are circumstances in which a glass of water may be worth a king's ransom, and other circumstances in which many gallons may be worth less than nothing. Generally speaking, the more there is of any kind of economic goods, the less is the value of any particular portion of it; but for an account of the precise manner in which such values have to be estimated, reference must be made to some of the more recent treatises on Economics. In the following chapter the subject will be referred to a little more definitely.

The terms Value and Worth, as we have previously noticed, are often used as synonymous; but Worth is sometimes used to designate values that are 'priceless'—*i.e.*, that cannot be estimated in economic terms. Kant drew the distinction in the following way[1]—'In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity. Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is *equivalent;* whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no

[1] Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, ed. Abbott, p. 53.

equivalent, has a dignity. Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a *market value;* whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a *fancy value;* but that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself, that has not merely a relative worth, *i.e.*, *value*, but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity.' The Platonists appear to have recognized a similar distinction; and it is referred to, though rather too slightly, by Aristotle,[1] in his antithesis between the things that we commend and the things that we reverence.

I intend, in what follows, to keep as strictly as the usage of the English language will permit to the distinction that is thus drawn between Value and Worth. On the whole, it appears to be in accordance with the best usage. Chaucer's worthy knight was called worthy because he was valiant and capable. The phrase in *Measure for Measure* 'your worth is able' seems to convey a similarly active sense. Even such an expression as 'worth a million pounds' probably referred originally to the amount of help that a man might be expected to render to the State in time of need—*i.e.*, it referred not so much to his possessions as to his power of service. Yet such worth is not thought of as merely instrumental. In its highest manifestations it is not merely valued, but worshipped or reverenced; and, in its lowlier forms, it is esteemed

[1] *Nicomachian Ethics*, Book I., chap. vi.

or respected. In any case, it is something that cannot be bought or sold. The importance of this distinction between Value and Worth will, I trust, appear more definitely at a later stage.

With regard to the much simpler distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value, Dr. G. E. Moore is perhaps among recent philosophical writers, the one who has explained and emphasized it most fully. It seems clearly unintelligible to maintain that everything that we value is esteemed only for its serviceableness for the realization or maintenance of some good other than itself. The question is only how that ultimate good is to be conceived. And it appears, on the face of it, that there are three main ways in which we may figure it to ourselves. We may think of it as something purely objective—*i.e.*, not dependent upon the attitude of any individual towards or upon the attitude of conscious beings in general. Or we may think of it as essentially subjective, and regard all objective goods as only means for the realization of a certain subjective condition. Or we may conceive of it as involving both an objective and a subjective aspect, as unintelligible without taking account of a certain relation of persons to things. I believe that this third view is the correct one; but it will be well to begin with some consideration of the other two.

THE fact that so many of our values are instrumental tends to make people think of value as a quality that attaches to particular things, as we have seen in the passage that was quoted from Spencer. The value of an instrument lies in the power that it possesses of rendering us certain services. But the ultimate value lies in the services that are rendered, not in the instruments as such; and, when we pass from instruments to services, it is not so obvious that we can point to any objects in which they can be regarded as inhering. When Mary anointed the Christ with oil, the oil might be said to possess value, but where did the value of the anointing lie? It also would seem to be instrumental. Its value lay in its significance. Similarly, a rifle has value in so far as it shoots straight and far; but what is the value of its shooting? Can we point to any object in which the value of that finally inheres? It is in the answer to this that realists tend to differ from idealists. Dr. G. E. Moore, who is certainly one of the best representations of the realistic conception, has definitely urged that value (or good) is a quality that attaches to certain things, just as such a quality as yellow attaches to them. A sovereign is yellow, and it is also valuable. But we have already seen that the development both of science and of philo-

sophy in modern times has led to the abandonment of the conception of qualities as being attached to things. The general conception of our universe, even from the most realistic point of view, is no longer one of a number of substances possessing qualities, but rather that of qualities combined in certain modes of unity. Primary qualities are modes of the spatio-temporal system. Secondary qualities are temporarily attached to certain positions in the spatial system. But values are tertiary qualities. To what are they to be regarded as attaching? It seems clear, on reflection, that they do not belong to any particular objects as such, but only to those objects in certain relations to others and to certain conscious beings by whom they are experienced. Even secondary qualities can hardly be considered apart from such a reference. A system of colours can, no doubt, be made an object of contemplation, just as the spatio-temporal system may, without reference to any particular consciousness by which such objects are apprehended; but whether what we understand by yellow can be interpreted without reference to any actual or potential mode of apprehension, is much more doubtful; and certainly, in the case of tertiary qualities, the possibility of such a separation from the experience of conscious beings, is still more open to question.

This problem is closely connected with the question, whether such qualities are capable of definition, or whether they have to be accepted on their individual merits, simply as they are presented to

us. Dr. Moore has urged that value or good not only resembles yellow in being a purely objective characteristic, but also in being incapable of definition.[1] We have simply to accept it as one of the characteristics that are found in the world that we apprehend. But it is surely not the case that yellow is incapable of definition. It can be defined by reference to its place in the scale of colours. It may be urged, however, that at least colour in general cannot be defined; and I should certainly be disposed to admit that this is the case. I suppose it would not be possible to convey to the mind of a person born blind any real apprehension of what colour is; though it might be possible to convey some idea of the way in which different colours are related to one another. These relations could be to some extent made intelligible by comparison with the relations between sounds. Of course colours can be classed among the objects that are sensibly apprehended; and their differentia may be said to lie in the fact that they are apprehended by means of the eyes; but this can hardly be said to amount to a definition. Is it only by means of some similar external reference that we can explain what we mean by value or good? This seems to resolve itself into the question, whether it is possible to 'dispute about tastes.' It is hardly possible to dispute about tastes, in the more primitive sense of that term; just as, in a similar sense, it is hardly possible to dispute about smells or sounds or colours. If what I see is yellow, it is

[1] *Principie Ethica*, pp 8 *sqq.*

vain to try to convince me that it is anything else. You may convince me that it is only because my eye is jaundiced that it appears to me as yellow. It remains true, however, that it presents itself to me as yellow; and what presents itself to me as yellow *is* yellow. Now, it does not appear that a similar contention applies to good or value. You may convince me that what I think good or beautiful is not really good or beautiful. Or, again, someone may at first think a play of Ibsen or a story by Dostoievski simply squalid, and afterwards realize that it is a thing of beauty. It may be urged, of course, that in such a case the object that is apprehended has become different. But the point is that an object of that sort depends for its very existence upon the way in which it is regarded. In such cases it seems to be strictly true that there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. The Taj Mahal by moonlight or a painting of Christ with the Cross would probably not have impressed Peter Bell any more than the primrose; and it may be doubted whether a play of Euripides seems particularly beautiful to the average schoolboy. Ripeness is all. In every case of intrinsic value it seems to be true that a change in the subjective attitude produces a change in the object. This suggests at least that the quality belongs to the attitude fully as much as to the object with which it is concerned. How far this can rightly be maintained is a question for further consideration; but at least we have here a *prima facie* case against the purely objective interpretation of value.

An instance of a somewhat simpler kind may help to make the position clearer. Gold is generally valued by human beings in every land. Its value is partly instrumental. It has some qualities that are extremely useful. It is hard, malleable and enduring, and thus is eminently serviceable for a variety of human purposes. But it is valued also for its colour, which is bright, restful, and not easily tarnished. Its attractiveness in these respects gives it a certain intrinsic value, quite independent of its use; but it seems clear that its attractiveness depends in some degree on our attitude towards it. Some psychologists maintain that yellow is not in itself an agreeable colour; but it is pretty certain that this is not universally the case. Some people prefer blue or purple; but their likings seem to depend on their temperament, their mood, and the particular associations that they happen to have formed. It would certainly not be easy to prove that they are either right or wrong in their preferences. Good taste, in such matters like wisdom, appears to be 'justified of all her children'; and their likings are not all alike.

Economic values may appear at first to be objective; but reflection shows that they depend, in general, on demand and supply—*i.e.*, on their attractiveness to particular persons and on the pains and difficulties involved in obtaining them. The possession or power of procuring such 'goods,' which is what is commonly meant by wealth, is, in the main, only the possession of instrumental values, serviceable for a variety of purposes. This

was what Ruskin sought to make clear by his contention that 'the only Wealth is Life.' It is essentially the same conclusion that was pointed to by Herbert Spencer when he urged that what has ultimate value is the maximum of life, estimated both in length and breadth. But, if we are to maintain that life has intrinsic value, we must try to ascertain somewhat definitely what we mean by life. Few people in Western countries would be prepared to assign much value to the lives of mosquitoes and other noxious insects; though in some Eastern countries they are carefully preserved in boxes. Ruskin at least, when he spoke of life, was clearly thinking of *human* life; and he did not mean that all modes of human life are equally valuable. He meant that we are to aim at 'more life and fuller.' He would probably have agreed with Aristotle in thinking that what we have ultimately to aim at is a certain perfection of the soul in a life that has some degree of completeness. But even this seems a little vague. Spencer tried to make it more definite by introducing a purely quantitative estimate; but he had to admit that the pursuit of the greatest amount of life is only justified by the assumption that life is essentially *pleasant*. This leads us to a subjective interpretation of value. It does not seem possible to rest in any purely objective end without some reference to the way in which we are affected by it. We are thus led to the consideration of value as subjective—*i.e.*, as being essentially related to or contained in certain conscious states.

WHEN we value anything, we generally *like* it; we are pleased by its presence and more or less pained by its absence; and hence it is not unnatural to suppose that the essential meaning of value is to be found in pleasure and pain. And it seems to be in a sense true—the sense, namely, that value cannot be wholly separated from *valuation;* that we cannot easily regard anything as intrinsically valuable (though we can quite easily regard it as instrumentally valuable) which we do not like, or which we cannot bring ourselves to like. What we like or dislike, what pleases us or pains us, is what we primarily value, positively or negatively, and we value other things as means for procuring what we like or dislike. Still, it is not our liking that we like, still less our disliking that we dislike. The poet has been said to be 'dowered with the hate of hate, the scorn of scorn, the love of love'; but most of us like or dislike particular things or persons. It may be urged, however, that the fact that we like or dislike them, the fact that we are pleased or pained by their presence, pained or pleased by their absence, is what gives them their positive or negative value. This is the view that is known as Hedonism; and it has had a long history, from the time of Socrates, or perhaps

earlier, to Henry Sidgwick, who may be taken as the last of its conspicuous representatives. In books dealing explicitly with Ethics, it is usual to give some account of the different forms that the doctrine has taken; but for our present purpose it may suffice to notice the way in which it was defended by Sidgwick.

Sidgwick's argument starts from the rejection of the purely objective conception of Value—or of 'Ultimate Good,' which is the expression that he generally uses for what has intrinsic value. Of course, it is not denied that we value many things that we do not like. Few people like surgical operations, yet the services of skilful surgeons are very highly valued. But it seems clear that the value that we attach to them is purely instrumental, not intrinsic. We value them because we value health and the free use of our limbs. But, it may be said, these also are objective conditions. When we say that a man 'enjoys good health,' what we mean is primarily that he *has* good health, and that it is a good thing to have. We do not mean primarily that he *enjoys* it, in the sense of liking it. The better it is, the less he is likely to care about it. Hence it is not uncommon to say that a particular person 'does not enjoy very good health'; not meaning to imply that he would not like it if he could get it.[1] It might be urged, therefore, that we recognize that it is health that has

[1] On this account Professor Alexander has recently given a new meaning to the word 'enjoy'; but with that we need not concern ourselves here.

value, quite irrespective of our liking or enjoyment of it. But if we go on to ask why we regard health as having value, it seems clear that the value that we attach to it is at least largely instrumental. It has value because it enables us to do our work more effectively, to take more interest in the world in which we live, to have a better prospect of being able to prolong our work and interests, and to have a more lively enjoyment in their continuance. It is perhaps even true that some people, who are not naturally of an active disposition, and who have not developed many interests in life, do really enjoy being a little unwell, as an excuse for idleness and a claim for sympathetic attention, so long at least as their illness is not actually painful in any considerable degree. Such people, at any rate, would not think that health, simply for its own sake, has any particular value. And what is true of health would seem to be true of most other objective conditions that are commonly regarded as having value. Most people, for instance, attach some value to freedom; but they value it chiefly because it enables them to choose the manner of life which they like; and here also there are some who prefer, as Milton complained,

> 'Bondage with ease to strenuous liberty.'

Sidgwick's general contention is that similar considerations apply to all objective ends that people appear to value. They are really valued as means to some subjective good.

He then proceeds to inquire what that subjective

good is; and this involves some consideration of psychology. Without following his argument in detail, we may note what appear to be the essential points. Our mental states are generally regarded as falling into three main classes. We are aware of something; we like it or dislike it; and we choose it or reject it. Now, when we consider awareness or knowledge, we see that, in general, it is valued only in so far as it is either useful or pleasant. Few people care to know how many grains of sand there are on the seashore, or what proportion of the immigrants into the United States were born on a Wednesday, or many other things of a more or less similar kind that it might be possible to ascertain. To know such things would not make anyone wiser or happier; and it seems, on reflection, that it is only knowledge that yields these results that has any real value. Some would go even farther than this. Many have repeated, with more or less definite approval, the saying, 'If I held truth in my hand, I would let it go for the pleasure of pursuing it.' This implies that it is the pleasure of knowing, rather than knowing by itself, that is really valued. And similar remarks seem to apply to choosing or willing. Kant maintained that the only thing that can be called good without qualification is a good will; but he appears to have meant by good *morally good*. In the sense in which good means *valuable*, it seems clear that *what we choose* must be regarded as what is primarily valued, rather than the *act of choosing*. Hence, on the whole, we seem to be led to the conclusion that intrinsic

value is not to be found either in knowing or choosing, but only in feeling—*i.e.*, if we were right in thinking that it is not to be found in anything that is purely objective. And it would seem that pleasant feeling has positive value and painful negative.

This line of argument, which was carefully developed by Sidgwick, seems to be convincing in so far as it leads to the conclusion that pleasant and painful feelings serve as an index of *valuation*, but not in so far as it involves the contention that they are in themselves the only ultimate modes of positive and negative values. This distinction was partly brought out by Sidgwick himself when he contended that, in some of the most prominent cases, in order to get pleasure we must forget it. The reason is that, if we seek pleasure, we are fixing our minds on valuation instead of on value. Pleasure comes to us when we get what we like; but, in order to get what we like, we must first like *something*. But, even if we like something, that fact does not necessarily show that what we like has intrinsic value. If a man likes breaking other men's heads, he will be pleased when he succeeds in doing it; but that does not prove that the result has any intrinsic value. In any case, to be pleased we must be pleased with something. Pleasure without any object would be like the vanishing smile on the Cheshire cat.

It is well to note, however, that there are some exceptional cases to which Sidgwick called attention, and which it is very important to understand.

He noted that, in the case of purely sensuous pleasures, it is not necessary to forget the pleasure in order to get it. A man who enjoys the taste of a delicate wine will probably enjoy it all the more if he reflects upon its pleasantness; and the same may be true of agreeable smells and sounds and even, in a somewhat less degree, of agreeable colours. The reason appears to be that, in such cases, the valuation comes to us without any conscious effort. The most obvious distinction between smells is that some of them are agreeable and some disagreeable; and we are seldom much in doubt as to which is which. They are given to us, almost from the first, as pleasing or otherwise. The same is true of most of what are called tastes—which, in fact, are largely smells. It is the man's palate that is pleased, rather than the man himself. The man sympathizes with the enjoyment of his palate, almost as a mother may enjoy the happiness of her child. Such pleasures are vicarious; and the same is true of the corresponding displeasures. We are all, as Gray expressed it, compelled to moan,

> 'The tender for another's pain, the unfeeling for his own';

but, in both cases, the 'moaning' is distinct from the object that occasions it. There is no pleasantness or unpleasantness apart from the valuation of some object other than itself. This, indeed, is now so generally recognized that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it further.

Some, however, who do not take pleasure in general as the essential constituent of value, do

tend, nevertheless, to think of value as being found in something purely subjective; and we must notice here certain other ways in which such a view has been set forth.

Carlyle was one of the most emphatic opponents of the view that ultimate value is to be found in pleasure. In his *Latter Day Pamphlets*, for instance, he poured ridicule upon that doctrine as 'The Pig Philosophy.' He urged that man 'can do without happiness; and instead thereof find blessedness.' To this J. S. Mill rightly enough replied that 'blessedness' seems to be a kind of pleasure, and that it may very well be a better kind than others, and consequently more valuable. But what Carlyle probably meant to indicate, though he does not seem to have made it clear, was that in the higher forms of satisfaction it is more apparent than it is in the lower that the enjoyment is not concentrated upon itself, but rather upon some valuable object. The Saint or Mystic who is enraptured by some 'beatific vision' is interested in the vision rather than in his own enjoyment of it. It is true, however, that such visions are apt to be somewhat vague or at least ineffable; so that they can hardly be expressed otherwise than in terms of feeling. The same is often true of the kind of joy that is often produced by intoxicants. Burns describes in glowing terms the happiness of Tam o' Shanter—

> 'Kings may be blest, but Tam was glorious,
> O'er a' the ills of life victorious.'

The bliss of opium eating has been more definitely described by De Quincey and others. And, when St. Paul exhorts people not to be 'drunk with wine, wherein is excess,' but rather to be 'filled with the spirit,' it may be thought that to be filled with the spirit is only a superior mode of intoxication; and that its essence lies in a kind of exalted feeling, without any definite reference to an object. The Eastern conception of 'Nirvana,' which is generally represented as being reached by the elimination of all desire, may be thought in like manner to be a purely subjective state. Such a state is generally described as one of peace—the peace 'that passes all understanding'—rather than one of pleasure. It is the absence of pain, rather than the presence of any satisfying object—at least of any object that can be definitely described. Such a conception is often found in Western thought, as well as in that of the East. Tennyson speaks of King Arthur as reaching his final goal when he passes 'to where beyond these voices there is peace'; and Mrs. Browning, even more emphatically, represents the highest good as being attained when 'He giveth His beloved sleep.' It is to be presumed, however, that such 'sleep' is not to be supposed to be wholly free from dreams—dreams that are undefined, but regarded as containing some supreme value. It is notable at least that some others who have sought to characterize the most blissful condition, have been led pretty far away from the conception of peace. Robert Browning, who was seldom in complete agreement with Elizabeth Bar-

rett, repudiates such a conception with scorn, and pictures the attainment to which he aspires, not as one of peace, but rather of continued effort.

> '"Strive and thrive!" cry "Speed! fight on, fare ever
> There as here!"'

And he thought the struggles of Earth a better condition than the untroubled calm of 'Rephan.' It was in a similar spirit that William James repudiated the quiet comforts of Chatauqua.[1]

It is to be remembered, however, that Robert Browning, in spite of his rejection of the idea of Peace, as the goal of effort, did nevertheless show some tendency to represent the ultimate value as subjective. He conceived it, however, not as pleasure or the absence of pain, but more positively as Love. He conceived that we must always fail in our efforts to reach truth, or any other end that implies some external object; but, in so far as we learn to love, we have reached all that is worth possessing. 'Love,' he says, 'is victory, the prize itself'; 'apprehended as a prize, a prize it is.' But, though this conception of the good may be regarded as subjective, it is at least a mode of subjectivity that points very directly to an object. It may be possible to have a bliss that contains no object, but we cannot at least conceive a love that is not the love of something. It must be directed to an object that is, in some sense, worthy to be loved. It might be urged, no doubt, that some of the finest

[1] See the passage quoted, with comments, in Bosanquet's *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 322 *sqq*.

forms of love are directed to objects that are undeserving. But at least they are conceived as potentially worthy. The mother who is devoted to a worthless son does not think of him as worthless; nor does the saint who loves sinners wish them to remain sinners. At any rate, it is not their own love that they love. It is some actual or potential loveliness. 'Love,' as Shakespeare expresses it, 'is to be all made of faith and service,' 'all adoration, duty and obedience.' It is directed to an object, and goes forth in action. Thus we seem to be led away from the purely subjective conception of value, just as we were led away from the purely objective one.

WE have now seen that there are difficulties in the way of thinking of value either as purely objective or as purely subjective—either as attaching simply to things that we apprehend or as belonging simply to our attitude towards them, as being pleased or pained, as achieving blessedness or peace, or as cultivating the attitude of love. The last of these ways of thinking of it seems, however, as we have already noted, to point to a way of reconciliation; since it involves both an objective and a subjective reference. Love is a subjective attitude, but it would be meaningless without reference to some object that is regarded as at least potentially lovable. What is lovable is naturally described by such terms as charming, beautiful, and the like—*i.e.*, by what are now usually called the tertiary qualities. The consideration of these leads us to the conception of a spiritual unity, which is at once a conscious centre and a focus for a world of objects. The primary qualities are those that are essentially spatial and temporal. Einstein and others have taught us to regard the spatio-temporal system as a limited universe capable of being regarded in a purely geometrical fashion. To regard it so involves, of course, the possession of a mind; but it seems possible to think of it as existing independently of the minds by which it is con-

templated. At any rate, they only contemplate it. They do not create it or, in any material respect, modify its structure. The secondary qualities cannot be so completely detached from minds. It is hard to say what colours or sounds or smells or tastes are without the minds to which they are somehow presented. But at least we may think of them as being, in the main, passively received by the minds to which they appear. In the case of the tertiary qualities, it seems clear that the function of the apprehending mind is of a much more intimate character. The saying of Hamlet that 'there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so,' may contain some exaggeration; but it is evident that we can get 'beyond good and bad' in a sense in which we cannot get beyond white and black or sweet and bitter. No doubt the distinction, like most distinctions, is not an absolutely sharp one. 'Tastes differ,' in the literal sense as well as in the figurative one; and those who are colour blind see things differently from those who have a more normal vision. But these variations can be pretty definitely accounted for by reference to the conditions of the objects and the structure of the organs. The conditions in the case of the tertiary qualities appear to be at least more subtle and more purely mental. A lover may 'see Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt' without any apparent defect in his organ of vision or any peculiarity in the object seen. When 'the immeasurable heavens break open to their highest,' the shepherd may 'gladden in his heart,' and Kant may have the

apprehension of sublimity, while for Carlyle it is 'a sad sight' and for Hamlet 'a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours.'

Such differences are due, in the main, to subjective conditions. We say that the lover is 'frantic,' that Carlyle was melancholy, that Hamlet was morbidly pessimistic. The shepherd may have been admiring the scene, or he may only have been pleased by the prospect of better weather. Kant was probably moved by somewhat similar reflections to those that led an earlier writer to exclaim, 'What is man that Thou art mindful of him!' or that led an American observer of the innumerable suns that appeared through the great telescope at the Lick Observatory to remark, 'Then it does not matter much whether Roosevelt or Taft is elected President!' It may have mattered a good deal all the same.

Looked at in this way, it would seem that the manner in which the beautiful or the sublime is regarded, depends very largely upon the attitude of the observer. It is such considerations that have led to the saying that there is no disputing about tastes; which is as if one should say that there is no disputing about religion. One might say rather that there are no other things that are much worth disputing about. When we are right about these, we can hardly be far wrong about the rest. It is clear enough that some religions are on a higher level than others; and it is also pretty clear that there is good taste and a taste that is not so good. One can say, with some confidence, that the man

who prefers Homer to Martin Tupper is right, and, with only a little less confidence, that the man who prefers Pope to Keats is wrong. In painting and music and most of the other arts it is perhaps not quite so easy for a layman to decide; for something more is needed in the way of technical training for any full appreciation of them. But here also there would not be very much difference of opinion among experts.

But, again, it has to be recognized that, though beauty can be judged by a standard, it yet has a certain individuality. There is no perfect beauty, as Bacon said, that has not some strangeness. The work of Keats is very different from that of Burns; yet each is excellent in its kind. Poetry, as well as wisdom, is justified of all her children. A work of art is not merely an expression; it is an expression of its author. When Horace said that he had raised a monument more lasting than bronze, he knew that his work would not merely be valued as a memorable expression, but as *his* expression. Everything that has style has this characteristic of individuality. It was said of Carlyle's letters that they were signed in every sentence, and not merely at the end. This seems to be true of every artist. We know very little about Homer or Shakespeare, but we recognize their voices, and perhaps that is enough. Lovers of paintings do not need to ask who did them. A beautiful object is not merely true to type, but it has a distinctive personality, and proclaims, like the firmament, the divinity of its creator. The soul of Adonais 'beacons from

the abodes where the eternal are.' It can hardly be maintained, with Comte, that the heavens declare the glory of Newton (or of Kepler or Einstein); but it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the skylark sings an Ode to Shelley. I suppose this was partly what was in the mind of Oscar Wilde when he said that nature copies art. Natural objects mean for us what the inspired writers have made them mean. There is 'never a senseless gust since man was born,' or at least since he learnt to sing.

It is on such grounds as these that recent philosophers have maintained that the essence of beauty lies in expression, and that there is no beauty except in the artistic presentation of it. This is a paradox; but what is meant is that beauty is not passively received. We have to look at it with a creative eye. We must love it before it will seem to us worthy to be loved. This has been well put by Mr. Carritt.[1] 'The man who appreciates a picture or a mountain æsthetically is in his degree an artist. None of these things is beautiful to him unless he expresses in it his feelings or, which once more is the same thing, it expresses, that is, reveals them to him. The writer of a poem expresses his passion in it. It expresses the passion to me, but only on condition that I have some such passion to express. The truth is that in reading a poem I express myself in it. I find words for what I have already been, and so first come fully to know it.'

[1] *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 182.

This is true at least of all the more subtle harmonies.

> 'We receive but what we give,
> And in our life alone does nature live.'

In this sense it may be held that valuation comes before value, or at least that the subjective and objective aspects of value are inseparably bound together.

But is beauty, thus understood, the only ultimate value? In a large sense of the term, I think this may fairly be maintained. Beauty is the only thing that is 'its own excuse for being.' Everything else has, in some way or other, to justify its existence. No doubt it sounds a little paradoxical to affirm this in English; for we tend to confine the term 'beauty' to things that can be sensuously apprehended. In English we more readily use the word 'good' to cover all sorts of things that we value; but we have already noted some ways in which that word may mislead us. The French 'beau' and the German 'schön' are applied more freely than our 'beautiful'—perhaps, indeed, a little too promiscuously. The Scotch 'bonnie' is also habitually applied with somewhat less restriction than the English term. But it is chiefly in the Greek use of τὸ καλόν that we find the fullest justification for the extension of the term to cover every mode of apprehended perfection; but to justify it fully we must try to see more clearly what we are to understand by Beauty.

It seems clear that we mean by Beauty some

thing that charms or pleases us; but there are certain 'difficult' modes of beauty that do not please immediately; and some things are apt to please us that can by no means be regarded as beautiful. Mr. F. H. Bradley has sought to mark its distinctive characteristic by describing it as the 'self-pleasant'—or, as we might say, the ultimately pleasant, that which is pleasant when it has been fully and clearly apprehended. To explain this we must return to some of the considerations about pleasure that were referred to in the preceding chapter, and especially to Sidgwick's point about the paradox of Hedonism.

This paradox, as we saw, lay in the fact that, in many cases, pleasure is best gained by not directly seeking it. It does not apply to purely sensuous pleasures; and the reason for this appears to be that in these cases it really is the pleasure itself that is valued, whereas in most other cases what is valued is some particular object. The lover of wine does not really love wine, but only the pleasant experience that can be derived from it. It is his palate, rather than himself, that is pleased by the wine; just as it is his nervous system, rather than himself, that is pained by an aching tooth. He likes the pleasure and dislikes the pain which his organism reports. It is otherwise with the lover of knowledge or the lover of his country or the lover of poetry or painting. Such lovers would derive no pleasure from the contemplation of the objects in question if they did not already value them for themselves, and not from the pleasure that they yield. Perhaps it may

be thought that those who have said that they would rather have the pursuit of truth than truth itself must be regarded as exceptions. But, if they really meant what they said, they were surely only half-hearted seekers. Those who like to hunt bears are not necessarily lovers of bears or even of bears' skins, which they may value only as trophies. They are rather lovers of hunting; and those who prefer the chase for truth to truth itself may be regarded as lovers of a particular kind of hunting. It is probable, however, that most of those who have made this statement about truth meant only that the whole truth would be too overwhelming an object to be grasped at once; it must be apprehended in successive portions. Otherwise, we should almost be forced to class them as lovers of pleasure, who happen specially to enjoy a particular kind of pleasure that can only be reached by developing a temporary interest in a special way of pursuing it; just as the hunter of bears may only care for the hunt for the sake of his health. Even a lover of drink may, in like manner, cultivate a taste for smuggling, and may even come to prefer the pursuit of drink to the enjoyment of it. Even the lover of poetry or other arts may degenerate into a connoisseur of old pictures and rare editions. The genuine lover of beauty, however, is delighted with the beautiful object itself. It pleases him so much in itself that he has no particular inclination to turn his attention upon the pleasure that it yields. This I take to be the meaning of calling it 'self-pleasant.' Its ways are ways of pleasantness, but

it is not the pleasantness that we value. The pleasantness is only the sign that we value *it*.

Now, it may be asked whether there are any other objects, besides beauty, about which the same may be affirmed. It is commonly said that there are three great modes of ultimate value——Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. Mr. Bertrand Russell has recently supplied us with a more extended list. In his interesting book on China he names as the things that have intrinsic worth 'Knowledge, art, instinctive happiness, and relations of friendship or affection.' By knowledge he explains that he does not mean mere information, but rather the kind of insight at which science and philosophy aim. It thus corresponds to what is generally meant by Truth as an ultimate aim. Art means Fine Art, and may thus be taken to cover what is meant by Beauty. Instinctive happiness seems to mean a general enjoyment of life, without special reference to any particular objects. Friendship or affection means goodness, understood in a somewhat limited sense. It is to some extent at least the basis of what is commonly meant by Goodness. Thus instinctive happiness seems to be the only definite addition to the three modes that are generally recognized. What may be said about this is that those who are instinctively happy seem to have secured some good that they more or less definitely value. It may be physical health or what Wordsworth called 'the genial sense of youth,' or it may be a variety of objects, the contemplation of a world that, in Stevenson's phrase, is 'full of a

number of things'—containing, for the most part, some degree of beauty. It seems doubtful whether such happiness, simply by itself, can be held to have ultimate value. It is a soil upon which ultimate values may be readily cultivated; and perhaps it is the only kind of value that animals or young children can possess. It seems also to be fairly common among certain types of madmen. Possibly it may even be taken as an anticipation of the 'serene and blissful mood' of those who have become as little children. But, when we seek to analyze it, it is doubtful whether we can point to any constituents that are not resolvable into some mode of Truth, Beauty, or Goodness. It may be best, therefore, to confine our attention to these; and, for the sake of clearness, it will be well to refer at this point to the distinction that was previously drawn between Worth and Value.

If we are right in thinking that value is to be found most definitely in beauty, and that beauty is not passively received, but actively created, then it would seem that we have to recognize two main sides in value—the beauty that is created, and the power that creates it. The former, as we have already seen, is perhaps what is most properly described as having ultimate value: the latter is what is more properly called worth. The thing produced is valued: the power that produces it is worshipped. The poem is praised, but it is the poet who is crowned, *laurea donandus apollinari.* Yet perhaps not always. Dr. Johnson is more highly esteemed than Boswell, though it is largely

by Boswell's artistry that his worth has been preserved for us. Now, the supreme modes of worth, understood in this sense, would seem to be wisdom (or insight), goodness (or love) and creative power. These, working together, give reality to beauty. Nothing is beautiful that is not in some way apprehended as real; and, in this sense, truth is necessarily included in beauty. Apart from this, truth can hardly be regarded as having value in itself. A truth may be 'odious.' If it were true that 'all is vanity and vexation of spirit,' the realization of this could hardly be described as beautiful. Matthew Arnold, taking a hint from Lucretius, ascribed this kind of realization to Goethe in the lines that were previously quoted.

But Goethe's real attitude was far other than that thus described:

> 'Es winden sich kronen
> In ewiger stille.
> Hier ist die fülle,
> Die thaten zu lohnen;
> Wir heissen euch hoffen.' [1]

[1] Translated characteristically by Carlyle at the end of the most glowing chapter of *Past and Present*:

> 'Here eyes do regard you
> In eternity's stillness.
> Here is all fullness,
> Ye brave, to reward you.
> Work and despair not.'

A translation almost equal to the original, and yet how different!

THE result reached so far is that, if we make a distinction between Worth and Value, we may hold that Worth includes the three main aspects of Wisdom, Power and Love, and that these give reality to Beauty. Now, if we ask what is the process by which this result is brought about, the general answer would seem to be that it is accomplished through the instrumentality of the Creative Imagination. The imagination is often thought of as a power that is mainly receptive or reproductive; but it seems clear that it may also be regarded as creative. Creative in any absolute sense no human being is; but the best art is not merely reproductive; nor indeed is the best science simply observational. Even the more mechanical arts involve invention. The philosophical thinker also is essentially synthetic or constructive. This aspect of human thought was powerfully enforced by Kant. It was his emphasis on it that constituted the 'Copernican revolution' which made him such a landmark in the history of speculative thought. He recognized also that it is through the constructive imagination that the synthetic work of thought is made effective. The imagination is the particularizing faculty that 'gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name.' Without such reconstruction even our knowledge of the past must

remain a blank for us. We can only properly apprehend it by a sort of recreation. Hence it has often been said that the history of England can be better learned from Shakespeare than from the chronicles. There may be more literal truth in the chronicles; but it is the poetic interpretation that makes the dry bones live. Carlyle's account of the French Revolution is probably in several respects misleading; but his vivid imagination has given it a reality for us which a mere recital of the facts would have failed to yield, except to those who had a similar power of imaginative creation. Perhaps in the same sense Tennyson has conveyed in his 'Charge of the Light Brigade' a truer vision of the significance of that episode than was present even to those who took part in it or than is to be gathered from the reports of those who witnessed it or learned about its details.[1] Without such work of the constructive imagination there could hardly be any such thing as intrinsic value; at least, it could hardly be conserved. But it is only in comparatively recent times that this has been at all adequately realized. Imaginative writers, no doubt, have always been prone to emphasize it. Horace is not alone in lamenting the values that have perished for lack of a sacred bard. Shakespeare, through the mouth of Hamlet, has told us that it is the true function of the dramatic art 'to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.' The things and events are not repro-

[1] I owe this illustration to Professor Conway.

duced; but their values are recreated and so made apparent. This, I believe, was what Aristotle meant by his saying that poetry is more philosophical than history. But this has too often been forgotten. Mr. Chesterton has done excellent service in recent times by his constant, even if too paradoxical, emphasis upon it; and Mr. Bertrand Russell has really been bringing out the same idea by his emphasis on 'the Free Man's Worship,' based, not on the facts of nature, but rather on the creative apprehension of value, and also by his antithesis between creation and possession in his book on *Social Reconstruction.* The fact that Tragedy has been generally recognized as the highest form of dramatic art serves to bring out the same point. We are purged, as Aristotle expressed it, by pity and terror. We have faced the worst; and yet, in spite of all, we have been made to realize that worth and beauty have not ceased to be worthy and beautiful. In Wordsworth's phrase, 'we feel that we are greater than we know.' We triumph over death in the half-conscious conviction that what is best of all does not die. The grass is still green, and love is still worthy to be loved. This conviction, however, is, in such cases, for the most part only half-conscious. We have still to inquire what is its exact significance, and how we are to justify such an imaginative outlook on the world.

Imagination, in the sense that is here referred to, has to be distinguished from the more purely scientific type of imagination that was celebrated

by Tyndall in his *Fragments of Science*, and that was used, with brilliant effect, by Cuvier, Clerk Maxwell, Lord Kelvin, and many others. The creative imagination may, no doubt, be used in scientific work as well—as it was, for instance, by Goethe. The more purely scientific or logical imagination is little more than an extension of the work of sense-perception; and it may even imply a certain weakness, rather than strength, in creative activity. It is essentially earth-bound. The creative imagination was strongly developed in ancient Greece. In modern times our own countrymen, though commonly said to be unimaginative,[1] are perhaps as richly endowed with it as any other; as our long succession of poetic artists shows. The French, with their power of detailed observation and lucid prose, are probably stronger in the more purely scientific type. The poet, in Tennyson's phrase,

> 'Looks at all things as they are,
> But through a kind of glory.'

He sets before himself the spirit of the object, as interpreted in the light of his own creative power, rather than the literal truth as it is more passively discerned.

It is this constructive activity of the mind that has been re-emphasized in recent times by a number of writers, both in our own country and else-

[1] Our country contains a considerable mixture of races, and it may be that the majority of our people are as deficient in this particular gift as a small minority are strong in it.

where. It was prominent among both the poets and the philosophers in the great age of German speculation, and it persists, perhaps with too little restraint, among the later Romantics. Frohschammer sought to apply it in the interpretation of Evolution. It seems to be, at least partly, what Professor Bergson understands by Intuition. Ribot has written an interesting book on the creative aspect of Imagination; and several others in France have worked on similar lines. Professor Pringle-Pattison may have committed himself to a somewhat questionable extreme by endorsing[1] the declaration of Mr. Yeats, that 'whatever of philosophy has been made poetry is alone permanent.' The treatment of the subject by Professor Sorley in his book on *Moral Values* is more restrained, and I have found it specially enlightening. But it is Mr. Douglas Fawcett who has made the freest play with the conception of creative imagination in the two remarkable books[2] in which it is definitely taken as the basis for a new philosophical construction. It can hardly be denied that he has put the case boldly, and with a considerable use of the power that he celebrates. He has employed the term 'consciring' to indicate what both he and others have emphasized as the synthetic work of the creative imagination. I appreciate his wholehearted enthusiasm in the development of this conception. But his system appears to me to be rendered somewhat fantastic by a too exclusive devo-

[1] In the Preface to his book on *The Idea of God.*

[2] *The World as Imagination* and *Divine Imagining.*

tion to this single principle. I think the use of imagination in philosophy, and even in poetry, has to be chastened by the recognition that, if it is to lead to satisfactory results, it must be controlled by reason and inspired by the love of beauty. The logical thoroughness of Hegel and the moral fervour of Plato are needed, as well as the free play of imagination. The three great elements of worth have to be combined in the search for that ultimate beauty which we may hope to be also the ultimate truth. It is in the light of these guiding conceptions that I now venture to reconsider the possibility of an idealistic interpretation of experience.[1]

[1] The general view that I have sought to indicate in the following Book, is more fully discussed in my *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*. But I have laid more emphasis here on the conception of imaginative creation.

BOOK III

APPLICATIONS OF THE IDEA OF VALUE

IN the light of what has now been stated, it is possible to turn back again to the idealistic interpretation of the Universe, with a better prospect of success in clearing away some of the most serious difficulties by which it is beset. First of all it is very important to be clear that by Idealism we are not to understand a doctrine that denies the reality of the spatio-temporal system. It is only with considerable qualification that even Berkeley can be held to have maintained its unreality. Even the Oriental conception of Mâya ought perhaps to be interpreted not as meaning mere illusion, but rather a finitising process.[1] At any rate, most modern idealists do not maintain that all is mind or spirit, but only that all has to be interpreted in the light of a spiritual principle. And this can hardly mean anything else than that the principle of interpretation is to be sought in human values, rather than in material conditions. From this point of view, even such a philosophy as that of Professor Alexander may be regarded as partly idealistic, though it makes an unfortunate start by setting out from the conceptions of pure Space and Time. The expression ascribed to Emerson and practically adopted by Browning 'too good not to be true,'

[1] Sir John Woodroffe (a good authority) has interpreted it in this way.

expresses emphatically the general faith by which it is animated.[1] The difficulties in the way of upholding such a faith are sufficiently apparent; and it must be confessed that few idealistic systems have been altogether successful in removing them. To this some reference has already been made; but we are now in a position to deal with it a little more fully.

We saw that Plato's idealism, with all its logical subtlety and imaginative depth, failed eventually through its inability to account for the apparent gulf between the ideal and the actual. If the account given in the *Timæus* is to be taken as an indication of the view to which he was himself inclined, it would seem that the ideal principle—*i.e.*, the conception of ultimate value—fails in its application to the spatio-temporal system through a defect in the material in which the ideal has to be embodied. If this explanation is to be taken seriously, it evidently implies an ultimate dualism. The ideal principle is one thing, and the material with which it has to deal is quite another. This was made more apparent, as we have already noted, by his successor Aristotle, who definitely recognized the two fundamental principles of Matter and Form. On such a presupposition no completely idealistic conception is possible; and, unless our

[1] Professor Pringle-Pattison has made much use of this conception in his recent book on *The Idea of Immortality*. It cannot, of course, be used as a basis for idealism; but, if an idealistic view can be otherwise established, it may be a legitimate application of such a view.

idealism is complete and all-inclusive, it can hardly be said to be an idealism at all. It is essentially the same difficulty that reappears in the philosophy of Leibniz, with whom also the universe is not to be regarded as the absolutely best, but only as the best possible. In the elaborate system of Hegel a great effort, and a largely successful effort, was made to remove this difficulty. Perhaps it was essentially a quite successful effort; but, at least on a first view, it hardly appears to be so. This is a difficult subject, which it would obviously be impossible to deal with adequately in such a book as this; but we must try to get as clear a view as we can of the main objection that is generally and naturally raised.

What is commonly said is that Hegel's system is too purely logical or rational. What he chiefly urges is that 'what is actual is rational'; and this is taken to be equivalent to the statement that what is actual is intrinsically good or right. Now, if the conception of value that I have been endeavouring to set forth is to be accepted, such a method of thinking of what is ultimately good must be regarded as inadequate. According to the view that is here advanced, ultimate good is only to be found in a complex whole in which supreme Worth generates supreme Value; and the supreme Worth has to be regarded as containing the three aspects of Wisdom, Love, and creative Power, which, acting in conjunction, produce Beauty. Such a view is not, I think, necessarily inconsistent with the Hegelism system, and might perhaps even be

held to be implied in it; but at least it can hardly be maintained that it has been explicitly set forth by Hegel. What might be urged is that the transition from the purely logical conceptions to their particular embodiments in the spatio-temporal system can hardly be made intelligible without postulating a mode of energy which can be most readily conceived as a creative imagination; and such an imagination, it would seem, must be conceived as aiming at the realization of beauty. But, if the Hegelian system is to be interpreted in this way, it seems misleading to affirm that the actual is rational: it would be truer to say that what is beautiful is gradually being made actual.

A somewhat similar objection may be made to the contention of the most systematic exponent of idealism whom we have had in Great Britain in recent years, Dr. Bernard Bosanquet. Certainly it cannot be said of him that he did not emphasize the conception of value; and indeed he tended to think of it largely in the form of beauty; and it might be fairly affirmed of his philosophy that it combines much of what is best in those of Plato and Hegel, and so removes some of the defects of each. Yet the place that he assigns to the conception of value in the interpretation of the Cosmos remains somewhat unsatisfactory. He says that what he, in common with many others, calls 'the Absolute,' is to be taken as the 'standard of value,' but is not to be regarded as itself possessing value. If this were understood as meaning that the Power underlying the spatio-temporal system is to be thought

of as having Worth rather than Value, and as being the source from which all values proceed, I should be disposed to concur. But I think the standard of goodness must itself be supposed to be supremely good. The view taken by Bosanquet leads, moreover, to an apparent denial of the reality of our universe—*i.e.*, of the spatio-temporal system—a view that appears to me to involve us in wholly gratuitous absurdities.[1]

Professor Bergson's doctrine of Creative Evolution is another form of Idealism which is undoubtedly instructive and has been found by many in a high degree inspiring. So far as it provides a basis for a better interpretation of biological evolution, it is certainly enlightening; but I believe some other more purely biological experts are more reliable on that subject. The opposition that M. Bergson has made between intellect and intuition tends to prevent the attribution of any clearly intelligible purpose to his Life Force. The same objection applies to some extent, I think, to Mr. Douglas Fawcett's conception of Divine imagining, which he thinks of as a power that 'creates as the lark sings.' It is probable that the lark sings by instinct, without any intention of realizing value. It is difficult to suppose that it really has any apprehension of 'things more true and deep than we mortals dream.' We at least do

[1] The difficulties involved in Bosanquet's view of Time have been well brought out by Professor Sorley in his article on 'Time and Reality' in *Mind*, April, 1923. Unfortunately there are great difficulties in *every* view of time.

dream of things that appear to have some truth and depth, and in that respect we can hardly doubt that we come a little nearer to the heart of things. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Power behind the spatio-temporal system is also aware of what It is about.

The interpretation of the Universe suggested by Sir Henry Jones in his recent Gifford Lectures, based largely on the teaching of Edward Caird, is essentially at one with the view that I am here advocating. It contains at least the conception (not altogether novel) of the Power that shapes the Universe as containing the three aspects of ultimate Worth that I have been seeking to emphasize. It is perhaps less satisfactory in explaining how these aspects can be supposed to produce our human values.

In order to deal with that aspect of the subject, it seems necessary to recognize at least an element of truth in the saying of Howison, that there can be no real creation unless there is a 'creation of creators,' a view that has been re-emphasized by Dr. James Ward.[1] Such a view seems no doubt, on a first hearing, to be almost self-contradictory—as, indeed, many of the deepest truths are apt to seem. If value exists only in and through creation, and if the Power behind the spatio-temporal system aims at the production of the supreme value, it seems clear that this can only be achieved by the development of creative power within the spatio-temporal system itself. In that sense, it would

[1] *The Realm of Ends*, p. 271.

seem, we must suppose that the essential aim of the universe, with which it 'groans and travails,' is to create creators. The infinite God, if we may so express it, aims at the production of the finite god. Such finite gods are in the position of the Platonic 'demiurge': they are creators working with an unformed material. Man, it would seem, is such a finite god; and there may be many others.

The general view that I am thus indicating has perhaps received its best literary expression in the poetry of Robert Browning—a fact that has also been well brought out by Sir Henry Jones. Browning combined, in an unusual degree, a triumphant optimism with an intense apprehension of the perplexities and tragedies of human life. He was convinced, on the one hand, that

> 'God's in his heaven,
> All's right with the world';

and so he found

> 'Earth not grey but rosy,
> Heaven not grim but fair of hue.'

On the other hand, he was keenly conscious of the apparent failures that are constantly to be found in life. His solution, as we partly noticed in a previous chapter, is that life has to be thought of as a struggle. We have to

> 'Welcome each rebuff that turns earth's smoothness rough,
> Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go';

because our function in life is not that of receiving good, but that of creating it. To such a view there

are, no doubt, several objections that may be raised; and it is right to notice one or two of them at this point.

The first objection that is apt to present itself is that such a view seems to imply some difficulty or limitation on the part of the creative principle. It may be true that, in the world as we know it, beauty can only be realized through conscious effort; and so that, as things are actually constituted, it is best that it should be thus realized—not passively, but actively. But, it may be urged, would it not have been better if it could have been realized more easily and securely? Might not the whole structure of the universe have conformed more nearly to the heart's desire? If the power behind the universe is omnipotent, why was it not so arranged that beauty should be realized without any appearance of ugliness? This consideration has led many people, such as J. S. Mill, to think that the Power by which the universe is controlled must be supposed to be somehow limited. This may be admitted. Creative power must be supposed to be limited by the other aspects that are involved in the conception of supreme Worth. Power must be supposed to be limited in its action by love and by the conditions of intelligibility. What these conditions are, is a problem that is perhaps most satisfactorily dealt with in the Logic of Hegel; but it is a very difficult problem, and it is highly probable that it will not be fully solved for a long time. It is itself one of the obstacles with which our finite intelligence has to contend. But at least it seems

clear that there are conditions of intelligible meaning, and that these must be observed in any creative activity. What is created, for instance, must not be self-contradictory. The absurdities arising from the conception of unlimited omnipotence have been well exposed by Dr. McTaggart,[1] and need not be further dwelt upon here.

Another objection, that is closely connected with the foregoing, is one that arises from the apparent irregularity of our universe. Granting that an intelligible universe must contain difficulties and obstacles for the exercise of the creative powers of finite intelligences, can we assign any reason why just the conditions that we find in the world around us should appear there? Can it be seriously maintained, in the language of Leibniz, that the world as we know it is the best of all possible worlds, even when we recognize that the best world is the world in which there is the fullest opportunity for creative activity? This is a question that it is not easy to answer; and perhaps it is even somewhat frivolous to raise it. The universe, as we now think of it, is known to be very much larger than was commonly supposed even at so comparatively recent a time as that of Leibniz; and we have no means of ascertaining what conditions are best for the development of creative intelligence throughout so vast a system. But most people find it difficult to believe that there can be any special appropriateness in just the particular combination of regularity and irregularity that we seem to discover. It looks, on the

[1] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, § 166.

face of it, as if this particular combination had either just happened to occur or had been arbitrarily selected. Hence Aristotle recognized chance and spontaneity (τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον) as elements in the structure of the world. A great deal that appeared to be casual or arbitrary in Aristotle's time is now known to be capable of rational explanation; but there is enough of such elements left to tempt even recent writers to recognize a certain element of chance. French writers, such as Poincaré and Boutroux, have perhaps been most prominent in this; but in our own country Dr. Schiller and Mr. Fawcett may be referred to. Such a recognition appears to contradict the idea of intelligent purpose. It seems to me, however, that, even if we recognize that some of the aspects of our universe may properly be described as arbitrary, this does not necessarily conflict with the idea of design. If there are to be finite creators or artists, there must be some raw material for them to work upon; and it may be a matter of indifference what particular material is presented. We have good reason to suppose that there are more worlds than one; and it is practically certain that the conditions in each of them must be different. Nor is this all. It now seems almost certain that the spatio-temporal system within which we live is finite. Hence it is possible that there are not merely other worlds than ours, but other universes. Thus there would seem to be ample scope for every conceivable variety of conditions, all affording scope for creative activity and the realization of beauty. If anything can be held to be certain

about the Cosmos, it is that it must be of unimaginable vastness.

The last objection that we need refer to here is that this whole way of dealing with the conception of value is too anthropomorphic. Why not say rather, as some have maintained, that the Power that underlies the spatio-temporal system or systems is probably 'beyond good and evil,' in any sense in which those terms can be understood by us? The answer, I think—setting aside anything that may be known by special revelation or mystical intuition—is that any theory that we put forward must be capable of being stated in terms that are intelligible to us. We may admit that our theory is only a hypothesis or postulate; and that the ultimate truth may be—as, indeed, it must, to some extent, be admitted to be—incomprehensible by us. In this sense, we must be content to remain agnostic. Still, it is at least reasonable to believe that the ultimate truth is not essentially opposed to the most intelligible hypothesis that we can frame. Human values are probably, to a large extent, unintelligible even to the higher animals, and quite incomprehensible to the lower; yet we see that some of their aims, as shown in their actions, are not altogether foreign to our own. It seems, therefore, not wholly rash to assume that, in like manner, the purposes of the universe are not wholly hostile to the best that we know. This seems to be at least a sound working hypothesis; and the recognition that we must be content with that, may be accepted as the grain of truth in the attitude of mind that is commonly referred to as Pragmatism

or Humanism. We have to try to form a logically coherent view of the Cosmos, even if we have to admit that it is to some extent only a guess. In this respect we are still in the position of Xenophanes.

If the view that I have been here endeavouring to set forth is tenable, it appears to furnish us with a final solution of the great problem of evil, which has vexed mankind so long. If our essential function is creative, and it is only through creative activity that the supreme value can be achieved, we need no longer complain like Hamlet that 'the time is out of joint,' as most times certainly are, and not least our own. It might perhaps even better become us to exclaim:

> 'The time is out of joint—inspiring sight!
> For we were born to help to set it right.'

But this, no doubt, would require a rather more complete confidence both in the theory and in ourselves than we can readily attain to. The effort to attain to it, however, is also a creative enterprise. At any rate, it is easy enough to see, in particular cases, that things evil in themselves are often the means, and apparently the only conceivable means, for the revelation of some greater good. Consider, for instance, what a loss it would have been to the world if the manuscript of Carlyle's *French Revolution* had not been destroyed. Without that very regrettable accident, it may be doubted whether we could ever have fully realized what a great-hearted hero he was. Other examples must readily occur to everyone, not least in connection with the recent tragic experiences in Europe.

IT seems clear that problems of right and wrong depend entirely upon the conception of value. This is to some extent concealed by the variety of terms that are commonly used in connection with the study of Ethics—*e.g.*, Good, Bad, Evil, Right, Wrong, Obligation, Duty, Virtue, Vice, Sin, Righteousness, Morality. This complexity is largely due to the fact that there are at least three distinct ways in which moral goodness may be conceived—(1) as obedience to law, human or divine, (2) as directed towards the promotion of welfare, individual or social, (3) as the perfection, or a step towards the perfection, of human character. These different ways of conceiving it are, of course, not necessarily opposed to one another: rather, any one of them almost inevitably involves the others. But the general way in which morality is thought of depends a good deal upon the aspect on which the main emphasis is laid. The first is perhaps the way in which morality is most commonly understood. Sometimes, indeed, the term is even restricted to the observance of laws of a somewhat specialized kind—especially those that are concerned with the regulation of family life. Murder is said to be criminal, while adultery is described as being immoral. This, I suppose, is mainly due to the fact that the State, in general, concerns itself

more directly with offences against life and property than with those that affect the welfare of the family. It is pretty obvious, however, that people who abstain from all these forms of wrongdoing and also from any others that are regarded as illegal, might still not be people who could, in any very active sense, be described as good. Laws tend to be mainly negative; and, even when they are positive injunctions, they cannot take much account of the spirit in which actions are done. The man who acts 'as ever in his great Taskmaster's eye' may not seem any better, from the point of view of the law, than one who acts rightly only when he is, more or less directly, under the eye of some visible taskmaster. Hence the mere observance of particular rules of conduct is often regarded with some degree of contempt by those who have a deeper conception of what is involved in goodness. The Puritans, for instance, who were much more zealous about morality than most people are, yet (or perhaps I should rather say 'consequently') were apt to pour a good deal of scorn upon mere 'legality.' Dr. Bosanquet called attention[1] to the term 'fushionless' as applied by Mause Headrigg to such a type of morality. This means that it lacks pith or driving force, because it is not based upon love or upon some consciousness of ultimate value. Poets and artists also, in their pursuit of beauty, are apt to oppose themselves rather strongly to such external observances. William Blake and Swinburne may be specially referred to as instances

[1] In his little book, *Some Suggestions in Ethics.*

of this tendency. It is in this sense also that some philosophers—such as Bosanquet,[1] to whom I have just referred—speak of morality as being concerned merely with 'claims and counterclaims,' such as might be brought forward in a law-court. The more extreme opposition of Nietzsche is based, at least partly, on a similar conception of morality; and it is in this sense also that the word 'Pharisee' has—perhaps unjustly—become a term of reproach. The real ground for this is that such legal obligations are not based on any definite conception of ultimate values, however much they may be defended as instrumental to the realization of such values. In the same way—to use a distinction that is perhaps more familiar at the present time—there may be some difference between 'behaving like a gentleman' and being one.

The thought of the promotion of social welfare yields a rather more positive conception of what is involved in moral goodness. Yet even the term 'philanthropist' has fallen into some disrepute. This is due to the fact that many people who appear to be aiming at social welfare are found, on closer examination, to be really aiming at their own glorification, or else have very imperfect conceptions of what is really for the benefit of the society in which they live.

To obviate these false conceptions of moral goodness, Mr. Bradley has introduced the important conception which is expressed in the phrase, 'My Station and its Duties.' This implies that one

[1] In *The Value and Destiny of the Individual.*

must first, as Carlyle urged, know what he can work at, and then devote himself whole-heartedly to it with a view to the realization of beauty. This involves the cultivation of personality. The virtues are, from this point of view, the qualities that fit a man for the fulfilment of the duties of his Station. Some of them, such as courage, self-restraint, perseverance, truthfulness and friendliness are necessary for any station. Others, such as justice, generosity, tactfulness and good taste, may be more specially required in some positions than in others. Yet, when carefully defined, they are probably all important in any station: only the ways in which they can be applied vary. What is called a liberal education, as distinguished from modes of education that are more or less technical or vocational, is mainly concerned with the development of such qualities.

This way of regarding morality brings it into direct relation to the conception of Worth, in the sense in which we have seen that that term may be distinguished from Value. Worth means those qualities that enable us to produce Value; and moral goodness consists of the possession of those qualities, rather than in the actual production of the values. 'Worth makes the man.' Yet it aims at the production of beauty. Its essence lies, as Aristotle stated, in its being τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα—'for the sake of the beautiful.' It is the lack of this conception that forms the weakness of Kant's doctrine of the 'Good Will' and even of Green's theory of 'Self-realization.' Worth is certainly of

fundamental importance; but it is directed towards the production of value. 'If our virtues did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike as if we had them not.' Kant sought to get over the difficulty involved in the exclusive emphasis on the good will, by saying that for the realization of the 'complete Good,' happiness is required as well. As we have seen, however, it seems better to say that value or beauty is required. Green seemed to express himself as if Worth simply aimed at its own production or conservation. This appears to be an error. Love is not the love of love, but the love of loveliness. Wisdom is not the understanding of itself, but the understanding of the truth. Creative power is not the 'Will to Power,' but the energy that gives rise to beauty. It is right to add that the defect in Kant's ethical theory was partly corrected in his *Critique of Judgment;* and that Green, at the end of his *Prolegomena to Ethics* (which he did not live to complete), was beginning to consider the place that has to be assigned in the moral life to the pursuit of beauty.

THAT religion is intimately concerned with ultimate values is obvious. Höffding urged[1] that it rests essentially on the postulate that all real values are conserved. It may be doubted whether this is a complete or universal statement of the meaning of religion; but at least it can hardly be denied that all highly developed religions are concerned with *worth* in the sense in which that may be distinguished from value. Worship means primarily the recognition of worth; and though, in current usage, it may have departed somewhat from its original meaning, that meaning is seldom wholly absent. What is worshipped is hardly ever regarded as deficient in some at least of the three main elements of worth. No doubt the heroes who are worshipped on earth have sometimes the defects that were alluded to by Shelley:

> 'The good lack power save to shed idle tears:
> The powerful goodness lack—worse need for them';

but the greater gods at least are generally thought of as being wise and good, as well as powerful. It is true, however, that even religious worship tends to begin with fear, and only to rise gradually to that reverence for wisdom and goodness which is

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 6.

the essence of the 'free man's worship.' It is hardly true, as Carlyle seems to have thought, that *all* religion is here to remind us of the infinite difference between a good man and a bad man. This can hardly be affirmed even of the higher religions without considerable qualification. Sometimes there appears to be a certain opposition between religion and *mere* morality; but, as we saw in the preceding chapter, this is largely due to imperfect conceptions of what is involved in morality, or to different senses in which the term may be understood. Matthew Arnold described religion as 'morality touched by emotion.' Some of our more recent idealistic writers would, I think, prefer to say that it is morality transformed by complete devotion to some supreme good. The most enthusiastic representative of this view was the late Dr. Bosanquet, who set it forth with great eloquence and thoroughness in his two volumes of Gifford Lectures, and in some respects even more finely in his little book, *What Religion Is*. The supreme good which he regards as the ultimate object of such devotion is the Absolute—*i.e.*, the Cosmos conceived as a super-personal unity. As I have already noted, there appears to be some lack of clearness in the way in which the perfect goodness of the Cosmos is conceived; and I think it is at least partly the absence of such a clear conception that prevents his view of religion from being brought into definite relation to morality. This comes out perhaps most strikingly in a passage in his book on religion, in which he quotes the aspira-

tion 'Thy Will be done,' without the addition of the words, 'in earth as it is done in heaven.' It may be somewhat difficult to interpret what is meant by saying that it is 'done in heaven'; but at least the words seem to imply a contrast between one part or aspect of the Cosmos and another, and the need of a certain effort to bring one part into harmony with the other. If we simply think of the Cosmos as a perfect and timeless whole, we seem bound to think of it as essentially perfect in all its parts, and it is difficult to see what need there can be for either prayer or effort on our part. Perhaps this difficulty can be removed by drawing a clear distinction between what happens in the world of appearance in time and what subsists eternally in reality—in Eastern phrase, between what is in Mâya and what is in Brahman, but even so it would appear that the prayer could only be fulfilled by escaping from the world of appearance, which is what is commonly thought in India, but surely not what was meant either by Christ or by Dr. Bosanquet. If we are to escape from such an interpretation, it seems clear that we must recognize that our moral effort is a real and essential element in the accomplishment of the divine purpose. Perhaps the quotation that was given by Carlyle at the beginning of his *Latter Day Pamphlets*—'we must help Him to mend it'—errs a little on the opposite side; but at least it does not seem possible to have the highest type of religion without some acknowledgment of the need of human co-operation for the creation of beauty. Love, as we have already

seen, appears to be essentially active and creative. Even Carlyle did not always recognize this. In one of his early Essays he quotes with approval the passage from Goethe:

> 'What shapest thou here at the world? 'Tis shapen long ago;
> The Maker shaped it; *He* thought it best even *so*.'

The obvious answer is that He did *not* think it best; else what are we here for? Surely we are here to try to make it better. Carlyle certainly would not have denied this; nor would Goethe; nor, I believe, would Bosanquet. The difficulty is to find a mode of statement which enables us to believe it fully without denying that the creative purpose behind the universe is also aiming at the best. The idea which is expressed by the phrase 'creation of creators' seems to be the one that most adequately meets this requirement.

It is true enough, however, as Bosanquet and others have urged, that morality, without something that can properly be called religion, tends to become 'fushionless.' It needs the thought of an ideal; and this is supplied by the conception of supreme value as the aim of all moral effort. This is contained in the higher religions, especially Buddhism and Christianity; but I think it is true to say that it is contained more positively and adequately in Christianity than in Buddhism. The ideal aim of the Buddhist appears as an aspiration after what is almost unattainable, and what can hardly ever be thought of except in a negative way;

whereas in Christianity, however its more recondite doctrines may be interpreted, it is thought of as being partially grasped by all who take part by faith in the creative effort, and as capable of complete attainment by humanity in the end. It is thus thought of, in Aristotle's phrase, as essentially something that can be 'done and achieved by man'—*πρακτὸν καὶ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ.* It is a Gospel, not merely for saints and sages, but also for the 'man in the street,' for little children, and, very emphatically, for those who (like most of us) are more or less bewildered sinners, hoping for better things. At any rate, it is the foundation of what is best in our Western civilization. The further consideration of this must be left to students of comparative religion.

It is commonly said—especially since the time of Kant—that the great postulates of morality, which have to be justified by a philosophy of religion, are God, Freedom, and Immortality. It is well to remember, however, that Buddhism can hardly be said to recognize any of them. I think it is clear that the view that I have been endeavouring to set forth justifies the belief in God, in the sense in which that term is understood in the more developed religions—a universal creative Spirit underlying the spatio-temporal system. It also justifies the belief in Freedom by the conception of creative purpose in human life. It is rather more difficult to see how far it provides a basis for a belief in immortality. Perhaps it may be held that this is implied in the conception of conservation of

values. But this is not immediately obvious. When Horace declared that he would not die altogether (*non omnis moriar*) he was thinking of the conservation of the values that he had created, not of the creative worth that was contained within himself—though, no doubt, the two things cannot be altogether separated. This is the kind of immortality that is ascribed to poets and sages, and that has been so highly esteemed by such writers as Samuel Butler. It can hardly be denied that it is worth achieving. But it is an immortality for the few. How far a more universal conception of immortality can be justified by purely philosophical considerations, is a more difficult problem, the discussion of which lies beyond the province of such a book as this.

Chapter IV *Value and Practical Life*

THE practical importance of a right theory of ultimate value must be apparent to everyone; but, in order to make its importance clear, it is necessary to call attention to some essential aspects of human life. What it seems specially necessary to emphasize is the fact that it is a co-operative adventure. The individual does not necessarily wither, but it can hardly be denied that the world is more and more. Recent events have made it more than ever apparent that all parts of our world are exposed to a common danger, and have the possibility of a common good by means of cordial co-operation. What that common good consists in ought to be capable—notwithstanding its very obvious complexity—of some pretty definite statement in the light of a theory of ultimate value.

If the view that we have arrived at is correct, the common good is a process of co-operative creation, having for its object the realization of what is best described as the most complete beauty achieved by the development of the most perfect worth. But we must now try to ascertain what the chief aspects of this co-operative process are.

It has always been more or less definitely recognized that human life has three main aspects—what

Aristotle distinguished as the vegetative, the animal, and the more distinctively human aspects.

> 'It is not growing like a tree
> In bulk that makes man better be';

yet he does grow like a tree. We are to some extent rooted in the soil on which we are born, nurtured by the influences of sun and air, and dependent on the resources of the material world for the support and advancement of our corporate life. We have also some animal passions and emotions that, on the one hand, enable us to act as a group, and, on the other hand, have a tendency to lead us into rivalry and conflict; and that are thus in constant need of regulation and control. But, in addition to all this, we have souls, or rather we *are* souls, which, even if not immortal, at least enable us to look before and after, and to aim at results to which, having regard to humanity as a whole, no definite limitation can be set. We thus have an economic life, which even plants may be said to have; we have a life of communal organization, which even many animals may be said to have; but we have also a life of moral, intellectual and spiritual endeavour, in which, so far as we know, no other creatures on earth have a share. On all of these the conception of value ought to help us to throw some light.

Economic values are clearly instrumental; and yet people are apt sometimes to think of them as if they were ultimate ends. This is partly due to the fact that some of them, such as food and cloth-

ing, are so essential to the maintenance of life that they may almost be regarded as a part of it. But it is also largely due to the fact that the spiritual nature of man can cast a sort of halo around even the lowliest objects. Even the lowest savages tend to think of adornment almost before they think of comfort. 'The poorest beggars are in the meanest things superfluous.' The eating of food may become for us a symbol and a sacrament as well as a necessity. The creative power of the human spirit can turn a hut into a temple and make of a piece of cloth an object of passionate devotion. Hence there is no final means of determining, by the mere inspection of objects, what their value for us may be. The value of anything depends on the person who has it and on the person who seeks to get it, and to the various purposes to which they may apply it. It is this fact that renders the study of economic values a matter of great complexity; and for this reason those who discuss economic problems are probably wise in confining their attention mainly to the conditions that determine *prices* and *wages* rather than to those that determine ultimate values. In doing this they have, not unnaturally, given most attention to the industrial conditions that exist at the time at which they happen to be writing. Writers who are interested in history or who are interested in methods of social reform have often raised objections to this procedure; and, in particular, as we have already had occasion to note, Ruskin put forward his emphatic declaration that 'the only wealth is life'

with the object of directing attention to real values rather than to market prices. It seems to me to be true, however, that Ruskin did not realize all the difficulties that are involved in the attempt to determine real values. He seems to have fallen into the error of thinking of the material conditions of life as things that can be valued simply for what they are and for the most immediate uses to which they can be put. When he urges, for instance,[1] that a single sheaf of wheat is capable of giving a definite amount of satisfaction to a human need, he seems to overlook the fact that its value depends on the way in which it is used and the circumstances in which it is employed. A single sheaf alone would have but little value for a human being. It has at least to have its grains sifted out before they are fit for us; and its value may be enhanced by the combination of these grains with portions of other materials. If it is taken raw it has a different value from what it has when it is cooked and baked. It has very little value for a man who has already a superabundance of meat, rice or potatoes, and fruit. It may have an almost incalculable value as part of a loaf in a time of famine. It is for such reasons that modern economists, such as Professor Marshall, have found it necessary to enter into somewhat elaborate mathematical calculations to determine the real value of economic goods. It is possible that they also may have fallen into some degree of error by relying too much on the simple satisfaction of human desires as the ultimate test

[1] *Munera Pulveris*, chap. i., § 13.

of economic values. But it is at least true that it would not be easy to apply any other kind of test that could be used with equal precision. What it is necessary to bear in mind is that economic goods derive their real value from the contribution that they make towards the realization of the ultimate purposes of human life; and that, though it is important to take account of human desires, and the pleasure that results from their satisfaction, it may sometimes be even more important to endeavour to modify these desires. The emphasis on this was probably what has most lasting value in the teaching of Ruskin; and at least it can hardly be denied that he and William Morris rendered an immense service by their insistence on the importance of artistic work in industry. Such considerations have not been altogether ignored by modern economists; and they cannot be further discussed in such a book as this; nor can we enter into the consideration of other economic problems that are connected with this one.[1]

Somewhat similar considerations apply to the instruments and institutions by which the life of an organized community is governed and controlled. What has chiefly to be noted in connection with this, is the place of the element of force, rather than that of desire. 'The State is Force,'

[1] Professor Pigou, who, like Dr. Marshall and the late Professor Smart, shows traces of the influence of Ruskin, has given some very admirable illustrations of the best methods of handling economic questions. Reference may be made, in particular, to his recent *Essays in Applied Economics*.

according to Treitschke; and Victor Hugo was only stating the same truth more generally in his phrase 'qui dit droit dit force.' Now, force is pretty clearly an evil, in a sense in which labour is not. Labour, when rightly applied, is a good, not merely in its results, but even in itself. It is in its essence creative, whereas force is repressive. Strictly speaking, no one can be forced to *do* anything: he can only be *prevented* from doing something. Labour, on the other hand, in its most perfect and most definitely creative forms, would seem to be the very end of human existence. But to realize this end it must have a certain power of choice and full scope for its exercise. Hence, while some restraint on human activity is necessary, and a good deal of guidance and control is desirable, it is nevertheless important that, as far as possible, it should be *free*. The restraints on human activity should be themselves restrained. That is to say, the element of force should be, as far as possible, eliminated. This is, no doubt, a counsel of perfection. Creative labour, well directed, should, as far as possible, be substituted for merely mechanical labour enforced by penalties. In this general form the statement is perhaps self-evident; but, when fully applied, its consequences may prove far-reaching.

It is only in spiritual development, however, that the fullest freedom is realized. All else is means, and can only in a limited sense be described as creative. Now, if we are right in the general view to which we have been led, the essence of

spiritual realization lies in the fact that it contains the three great elements of worth—love, wisdom, and creative power—and that these, acting in unison, produce beauty. Mr. Russell, in his very brilliant book on Social Reconstruction, has rightly emphasized the supreme importance of the creative element in human life; but I think the antithesis that he has made between creation and possession is to some extent misleading. Man is creative, but he does not create out of nothing. He may out of two sounds produce, according to Browning, 'not a third sound but a star'; but he must first have the two sounds. Similarly, a man may create a garden; but he must first, in some sense, possess the soil—*i.e.*, have at least some security of tenure. A woman may create a home; but she must first have a house. Human creation implies the possession of the raw material out of which the creation is to be made. Moreover, he who creates anything (such as a picture) creates it in order that he or others may possess it; and, if they are to possess it, they must, in a sense, re-create it. What we have inherited from our fathers, in the well-known phrase of Goethe, we must earn in order that we may possess it. The opposite of creation is, I should think, not possession but passivity or obstruction. No doubt this attitude is very liable to be produced by possession; and it may be true that it is easier for a camel to pass through a 'needle's eye' than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of creators; and perhaps this is all that Mr. Russell meant to imply. The desire to possess

without using is perhaps rightly described as the root of all evil. Possessions have to be regarded as instruments. Man is, as Carlyle said, a 'tool-using animal.' A dog is not; and, when a man is deprived of his tools, he may very rightly be said to be treated like a dog. On the other hand, if he does not seek to use his tools, he is, more or less, making a beast of himself. 'We only toil who are the first of things.' We are the first of things *because* and in so far as we are capable of creative toil. To quote again from Goethe,[1] 'Man alone can perform the impossible; He distinguishes, chooses and judges.' Bees and beavers may be said to *make*, but not to *create*. So far at least as we can judge, they seem only to do what their instincts tell them. Their activities are not guided by love and wisdom, at least not in any high degree. For us there is no definite limitation.

This, it seems to me, is the root of the whole matter. Property is not always 'theft'; but it is important that the tools should go to him who can use them, and should be employed in the creation of real values, instrumental or intrinsic. No doubt this calls for much more amplification than can be given to it here. But the practical application of the philosophy that I have been endeavouring to set forth, so far as it concerns our present human life, is that, after our many devious wanderings, our apprenticeships and travels, our various

[1] 'Nur allein der Mensch vermag das unmögliche;
Er unterscheidet, wählet und richtet;
Er kann dem Augenblick Dauer verleihen.'

methods of sowing wild oats, we should settle down steadily, like Candide, to 'cultivate our garden.' Our garden is this terraqueous globe, full enough of weeds and thistles. We have to do our best, each in his own way, to turn it into a Garden of Eden. And, in doing this, we seem to have good reason to believe that the Power behind our universe is working with us—perhaps we may even suppose, growing with us,

> 'Consciousness the Will informing, till it fashion all things fair.'

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